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Abstract
This dissertation examines the effects of employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) 
on shareholder wealth, corporate control, and insider trading. In the first of three 
essays, a revision of the asymmetric information hypothesis is applied to the securities 
issuance structure of the ESOP to provide an explanation of the ESOP announcement’s 
effect on shareholder wealth. Essay two examines the effects of the firm’s (and its state 
of incorporation’s) supermajority provisions, level of pre- and post-announcement 
managerial voting power, and takeover "attractiveness" on the announcement-day 
reaction. The final essay examines the managers’ insider trading activities around the 
announcement of the ESOP.
The first essay provides evidence that for announcements made in the absence of 
takeover activity, the market’s reaction to ESOPs partially structured with previously 
unissued common stock and convertible preferred equity is significantly and positively 
affected by the presence of a simultaneous repurchase announcement. In contrast, a 
similar analysis of ESOPs announced without a simultaneous repurchase finds an 
insignificant market reaction to ESOPs structured with common stock and a weakly 
significant and negative reaction to ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity. 
This finding is supportive of the revised asymmetric information hypothesis.
The results of the second essay suggest that the market discriminates between firms 
that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. A significant negative market reaction 
is observed when the "attractive" firms announce an ESOP that increases the managers’
ix
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voting power from a low to high level of entrenchment. In contrast, insignificant 
results are found in a similar "low-to-high" examination of unattractive firms.
The final essay examines the managers’ insider trading activities around the 
announcement of the ESOP and argues that these trading activities are related to the 
structure of the ESOP. Insiders significantly reduce the number, and dollar value, of 
their shares sold in the months immediately surrounding the announcement of ESOPs 
structured with repurchased equity. Similar results are noted for the sample of ESOPs 
that experience a significant positive announcement-day reaction.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 1 
An Overview
1.1. Introduction
This dissertation examines the shareholder wealth effects o f an announced employee 
stock ownership plan (ESOP) within three separate frameworks based on a revision of 
the asymmetric information hypothesis, insider ownership, and insider trading activities. 
Though an ESOP is regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), there are many features that distinguish it from other ERISA-governed 
pension plans.
First, ESOPs are established as separate legal entities and therefore allowed to 
borrow from sources outside the firm. Non-ESOP pensions do not have similar 
borrowing potential and are not a source of financing to the firm. Second, these 
borrowed funds are used to purchase large blocks of the firm’s convertible preferred 
equity and common stock. In contrast, ERISA limits the investments of a non-ESOP 
pension plan to a small percentage of the firm’s equity. Consequently, a firm’s capital 
structure is effectively, perhaps materially, altered by the establishment o f an ESOP.1 
The securities issuance structure of the ESOP and the corresponding information 
inferred by the market is the subject of the first essay of this dissertation (chapter 3).
Third, because of the potentially large purchase of equity, the ESOP is likely to 
have a material effect on the voting power structure of the firm, a characteristic of
'In relation to a firm’s capital structure, the ESOP trust’s debt is typically guaranteed by the firm and 
therefore recorded as a balance sheet liability. Moreover, the equity securities purchased by the ESOP 
are frequently used as collateral on the loan.
1
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2material concern to managers o f firms with a non-zero probability of experiencing a 
takeover. The second essay (chapter 4) examines the relationship between the market’s 
announcement-day reaction and the change in voting power attributed to the ESOP.
Finally, by assuming that ESOPs increase a firm’s managerial voting power, one 
question that arises is, "Does this change in voting power have an effect on 
management’s personal ownership in the firm?" To address this question, the third 
essay (chapter 5) analyzes the trading patterns of managers (insiders) in the stock of 
their firm around the announcement of the ESOP.
1.2. The Security Issuance Structure
The first essay (chapter 3) is based on the fact that the during the ESOP formation 
process, the number of available ESOP structures is large. The ESOP may borrow 
from the firm or a private institution and use these funds to purchase common stock and 
convertible preferred shares directly from the firm, privately, or in the open market. 
An ESOP can therefore be thought of as an alternative source of capital to the firm. 
Thus, Myers and Majluf’s (1984) asymmetric information theory of securities issuance2 
is applicable to the establishment and expansion of an ESOP. Given the variety of 
ESOP-related security issuances, and assuming that the market believes that the 
managers have superior knowledge about the firm’s future cash flows, the relevant 
question is whether differing ESOP structures alter the market’s perception of the value 
of the firm.
2Myers and M ajluPs asymmetric information argument is that the issuance o f equity securities is 
viewed by the market as negative information. Management’s choice o f equity implies the stock is 
overvalued based on the presumed inside information about the true state o f the firm. Empirical evidence 
(Smith, 1986) is consistent with this hypothesis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3With the added assumption that managers act in the best interest of the firm’s 
current shareholders and employees, the first essay argues that the market’s perception 
o f firm value in response to an ESOP should differ from that formed during the 
announcement of a comparable non-ESOP equity issue. Unlike their situation in a non- 
ESOP issue, the firm’s employees are directly affected by an ESOP-related security 
issue. Funding an ESOP with an overpriced security is likely to be detrimental to the 
employees’ and the firm’s performance, and thus to the manager’s job security. Essay 
one is, therefore, a modified application of Myers and Majluf’s theory on the issuance 
of securities in an asymmetric information environment.
The results of the examination of ESOPs established and expanded in the 1980-1993 
period support an asymmetric information explanation of the market’s reaction to 
ESOPs announced in the absence of takeover activity. Moreover, ESOPs structured 
with repurchased equity appear to have an overriding positive effect on the market’s 
reaction to various ESOP structures. Finally, ESOPs announced in the presence of 
takeover activity have a significant negative effect (on average) on firm value.
1.3. Voting Power
Chapter 4 (essay two) is based on the assumption that the holders of the ESOP 
shares (i.e., the trustee and employees) will generally vote with management if a hostile 
takeover arises. Therefore, ESOPs presumably have an effect on managerial voting 
power and the market for corporate control. The second essay employs three analytical 
improvements over prior insider ownership/corporate control research to gain additional 
insight into the relation between ESOPs and corporate control. First, in this analysis
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4the insider ownership variable o f concern will account for the supermajority provisions 
that differ by the state of incorporation and corporate bylaws. Prior insider ownership 
research implicitly assumes that a firm with a given level of insider ownership has the 
same degree o f takeover protection (i.e., entrenchment) irrespective of a supermajority 
provision. Based on the significant negative market reaction to the announcement of 
a supermajority amendment (e.g., Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987, and Karpoff and 
Malatesta, 1989), the implicit assumption appears to be inaccurate.
A second improvement over prior corporate control research is to recognize 
explicitly that the effect of insider ownership on the probability of a takeover, and 
therefore on the value of the firm , differs by the degree of takeover "attractiveness" that 
a firm possesses. For example, a firm with an excessively high level of debt, low cash 
flow, and stagnant growth (i.e., an unattractive firm) is likely to have a very low 
probability of being taken over regardless of the change in voting ownership caused by 
the ESOP. Changes in firm value caused by an ESOP-related increase in insider voting 
power should therefore be smaller for unattractive firms, all else equal. Past insider 
ownership/corporate control research has implicitly assumed that all firms are equally 
attractive targets, and therefore that the "probability of takeover" changes as the level 
of insider voting power changes.
The final difference in approach in the second essay is the incorporation of pre- and 
post-announcement levels of voting power controlled by management. It is 
hypothesized that firms with a low level of managerial voting power prior to the ESOP 
will experience a positive (negative) market reaction if the post level of voting power
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5remains "low" (is changed to "high"). The management entrenchment hypothesis 
predicts the negative market reaction because management has reached a level of voting 
power that can eliminate all takeover threats and associated premiums. Conversely, the 
shareholder interests hypothesis asserts that the positive reaction is expected because 
management, unable to entrench themselves, will use the added (ESOP) voting power 
to negotiate a higher premium if a takeover is attempted. In contrast, past ESOP 
research has predominantly focused on the pre-announcement level of insider 
ownership, resulting in a prediction that firms with a low level of insider ownership 
prior to the ESOP will experience a positive market reaction, regardless of the post­
announcement level of insider power.
The second essay incorporates these three elements into a regression of the firms’ 
cumulative prediction errors onto varying ownership variables to determine whether the 
hypothesized shareholder interests and management entrenchment effects differ between 
ESOP firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. The regression 
differentiates firms by their levels of pre- and post-announcement insider ownership, 
and accounts for the differences in managerial voting power caused by a supermajority 
provision. The importance of this analysis extends beyond ESOPs, with potential 
application to the examination of other financial events that affect a firm’s value via a 
change in insider ownership (managerial voting power).
The results of essay two (chapter 4) support the argument that the market 
discriminates between ESOP firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. The 
findings also support the hypothesis that the post-announcement level of ownership has
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6a significant effect on the prediction error outcome. That is, for the sample of 
attractive ESOP firms, the results suggest that the market negatively reacts to ESOPs 
announced by firms that increase their level of managerial voting power from "low" to 
"high." Insignificant outcomes are found for a similar low-to-high analysis of 
unattractive firms,
1.4. Insider Trading Activities
The final essay (chapter 5) examines the managers’ ("insiders’") trading activities 
in the stock of their firm around the announcement o f an ESOP. In addition to 
examining the trades that affect the managers’ personal wealth in an environment of 
(assumed) asymmetric information and SEC regulation, the insiders’ trading activities 
can also be used as a proxy for the firm’s private information. In this sense, further 
evidence is provided relevant to the asymmetric information hypotheses noted in the 
first essay.
The examination of insider trading activities around the ESOP announcement is also 
connected to the analyses outlined in the second essay. This association is based on the 
notion that an increase in voting power from the ESOP formation allows management 
to reduce its level of personal (cash-flow) ownership in the firm without reducing the 
effective level of entrenchment. Furthermore, differing insider trading activities are 
predicted for managers of attractive and unattractive firms. To be specific, the 
managers of unattractive firms are hypothesized to have a smaller concern for their 
level of voting ownership and therefore have an opportunity to participate in a larger
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7sell-off of personal shares without a material increase in the probability of a takeover 
or a decrease in job security.
Finally, assuming that the managers are relatively aware o f the market’s 
forthcoming reaction to the ESOP announcement, the analysis of their trading activities 
indicates whether they are engaging in personal wealth maximization. For example, 
a significant insider net sell-off is expected prior to the announcement of an ESOP 
associated with a negative market reaction. The sell-off is therefore made at a price 
that is subsequently revealed to the market to be excessive, and the insider has avoided 
a decrease in personal wealth. This analysis also provides cursory evidence about the 
SEC trading penalties’ effects on insider trading.3 A more sanguine argument 
consistent with this prediction is provided by John and Mishra’s (1990) signalling 
model, which suggests that the insiders’ trading activities and the firm’s announcement 
act as a joint signal to the market. Regardless, the point to be made is that there is a 
hypothesized correlation between the insider trading activities and the direction of the 
stock price reaction.
The findings detailed in chapter 5 show that for ESOPs structured with repurchased 
equity, the net number (and net dollar value) of shares sold by the firms’ managers is 
significantly lower during the immediate months surrounding the announcement. 
Similar results are found for ESOP firms that experienced a significant positive 
prediction error.
-The purpose o f the analysis is to test for an association between the insiders’ trading activities and 
the market’s reaction to the ESOP announcement. It is not meant to test for (or imply) an 
unethical/illegal insider trading activity.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8The next chapter provides background information and a review of the literature 
that addresses the areas often cited as the reasons for establishing an ESOP: 1) tax 
benefits; 2) employee motivation; and 3) corporate control implications. A fourth 
explanation in the literature, but not discussed here, is the establishment of an ESOP 
in conjunction with a leveraged buyout (LBO) of the firm.4
The structure and format of each of the three essays (chapters 3, 4, and 5) is 
identical. That is, each chapter starts with an introduction and literature review specific 
to the essay under analysis. Testable hypotheses, data description and methods of 
analysis, results, and conclusions are the four sections to follow within each of the three 
chapters. Finally, chapter 6 contains an integrated set of conclusions from this analysis 
o f ESOPs in asymmetric information, insider ownership, and insider trading 
frameworks.
4For ESOP LBOs, management borrows (via the ESOP) to repurchase the firm ’s outstanding equity. 
The leveraged ESOP’s 50 percent interest income exclusion, and the LBO’s effectiveness as a takeover 
deterrent, made the ESOP LBO strategy popular in the mid-to-late 1980s. A detailed description and 
analysis o f  ESOP LBOs is provided in Chang (1990).
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Chapter 2 
Background and Literature Review
2.1. Introduction
An employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) is a tax-qualified, defined contribution 
pension plan5 established as a separate legal entity to be managed by a hired trustee. 
Similar to most pension plans, ESOPs are subject to the regulations outlined in the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Unlike most plans, which 
are required to have their pension fund investments "prudently" managed (i.e., 
diversified), the employee stock ownership trust (ESOT)6 is typically arranged to 
purchase a large block of the sponsoring company’s equity.7 Initially the stock is held 
in an "unallocated" suspense account, but over time the shares are allocated to the 
individual employee accounts8 maintained within the trust. The voting rights attached 
to the shares held in the suspense account and individual employee accounts are 
controlled by the trustee and employees, respectively. Furthermore, common and
5The plan is "tax qualified" because a distribution to an employee’s ESOP account is tax deferred 
until withdrawn. Furthermore, it is a "defined contribution" plan because the firm is required to provide 
predetermined contributions to the trust, as opposed to a defined benefit plan where the required benefits 
paid to the employees on retirement are predetermined.
“This review does not distinguish between "ESOP", the acronym used as a general description o f the 
employee benefit plan, and "ESOT", a specific definition of the legally created trust established to 
purchase the firm ’s equity and maintain the employees’ pension accounts. Common procedure in the 
literature is to refer to both as "ESOP."
7ERISA requires that a minimum o f 50 percent o f the ESOP firm ’s assets must be invested in the 
firm’s equity.
“As an ESOP’s debt is paid o ff (from company contributions and dividends), a comparable dollar 
value of shares is allocated to the individual employees’ ESOP accounts. Upon leaving the company, 
the employees are given the vested portion o f  their "allocated" accounts or allowed to sell the equity back 
to the firm at the fair market value.
9
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convertible preferred stocks are the only employer securities qualified for the ESOP- 
related tax benefits. Finally, for convertible preferred shares to be qualified, the firm’s 
common stock must have a tradeable market.
In sum, because of its separate legal status, an ESOP is allowed to incur debt to 
purchase the firm’s convertible preferred and common equity in the open market, 
privately, or directly from the company. To aid in the understanding of the variety of 
ESOP structures available to management, several Nexis Newswire press releases are 
summarized below:
Standard Motor Products. Inc.. January 9. 1989: "Standard Motor Products said 
its board o f directors authorized the establishment of an employee stock ownership 
plan. The company also said it believes that when the plan is funded, the plan will 
buy about one million shares of Standard’s outstanding common stock in the open 
market."
Proctor & Gamble Company. January 11. 1989: "The Proctor & Gamble Company 
today announced the creation of a leveraged ESOP within its existing profit sharing 
plans. Concurrently, it announced an expanded common stock repurchase program. 
The LESOP trust intends to borrow up to $1.0 billion for a period of 15 years, with 
the loan being guaranteed by the company. The proceeds from the loan will be 
used to purchase a new issue of convertible preferred stock from the company. 
In a related matter, the board of directors has authorized the company to use the 
eventual proceeds from the issuance of the convertible preferred stock to repurchase 
up to 12 million shares of its common stock to more than offset the dilution effect 
of the newly issued convertible preferred stock."
Longs Drug Stores. March 8. 1989: "Robert M. Long, president and CEO, 
announced that Longs had sold 696,864 shares of its common stock to the ESOP. 
Long stated that the ESOP now owns 14.30 percent of the Longs outstanding 
shares."
Diamond Shamrock R & M. Inc.. April 21. 1989: "The Diamond Shamrock board 
of directors today announced that it has expanded its employee stock program with 
the establishment o f a new employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) which purchased 
approximately 1.4 million shares of common stock from the company for $30 
million. The company also announced that it will expand its share repurchase
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program to reduce the number of outstanding shares to a level in line with the pre­
expanded ESOP amount of 24 million common shares."
As a prelude to the asymmetric information analysis in chapter 3, the structure of
the four ESOPs described above are categorized as follows:
Proctor & Gamble: Repurchase, leveraged ESOP, convertible preferred.
Longs Drug Stores: Previously unissued common stock.
Diamond Shamrock: Previously unissued common stock, repurchase.
Several theories on the establishment of ESOPs have been forwarded over the 
years. The remainder of this chapter will review three of the more common 
hypothesized motives for a firm to institute an employee stock ownership plan: 1) 
ESOP-related tax benefits; 2) employee motivation; and 3) corporate control.
2.2. ESOP-related Tax Benefits
After the ERISA "acknowledgement"9 of ESOPs in 1974, the importance of an 
employee stock ownership plan was further enhanced with the creation of an ESOP- 
related one percent investment tax credit by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, and an 
additional increase of one-half percent in 1976 for matched employee contributions. 
Despite the subsequent structural changes and ultimate elimination o f the credits in 
December of 1986, significant legislative benefits were added in 1984 and 1986. The 
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which took full effect at the beginning of 1985, allows 
corporations to deduct the dividends that are passed through to the owners (employees)
'The Employment Retirement Income Security Act o f  1974 included specific ESOP provisions, 
boosting their acceptability. Few ESOPs existed prior to the 1974 Act.
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of the allocated ESOP shares. These "passed through" dividends, however, become 
taxable income to the employees when received. The ESOP-dividend tax benefit was 
expanded by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to allow for the deduction of dividends 
received by the unallocated ESOP shares and used to reduce the outstanding debt.
The 1984 tax reform also provided a significant incentive (to establish an ESOP) 
in the form of a 50 percent income exclusion on the interest earned by a lending 
institution from an ESOP-related loan.10 Part of this benefit typically flowed through 
to the ESOP in the form of a lower debt rate than that of an equivalent risk, non-ESOP 
loan. Four years later, Congress, in an attempt to meet its goal of reducing the deficit, 
enacted guidelines to restrict the 50 percent interest exclusion to a minority of firms 
with significant ESOP ownership. The interest exclusion amendments (restrictions) 
generally apply to ESOP-related loans made subsequent to July 10, 1989.
An incorporation of these tax provisions formed the basis of Chen and Kessinger 
(1985), with its description of establishing a leveraged ESOP to effectively issue a "tax 
deductible equity." That is, they argue that for ESOPs purchasing common stock with 
bank loan funds, the firm will enjoy the benefits of debt and equity. The tax deductible 
company contributions to the ESOP,11 used to repay the loan, translate into a reduction 
of taxable income that equals or exceeds the sum of the interest and principal payments, 
a tax benefit superior to that of ordinary debt. Furthermore, the potential inclusion of
10Per Beatty (1995), "This exclusion was provided to banks for any loan made after July 18, 1984, 
and to insurance and investment companies for loans made after October 22, 1986."
“ The tax deductibility o f ESOP contributions used to repay the loan principal is limited to 25% of 
the employees’ total compensation. No limit exists for company contributions applied to the payment o f 
the ESOP loan’s interest.
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dividends as a taxable expense further converts the common stock into a debt-like 
instrument, but without the threat of bankruptcy proceedings if the dividends are 
reduced or eliminated.
Despite the enticing tax benefits, most ESOP studies have yet to support a 
significant ESOP tax effect. For example, Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1990) note that 
since company contributions are deductible as a business expense under all employee 
benefit plans, the deduction of interest and principal payments on a leveraged ESOP are 
not a unique tax benefit. If the intent of management is to establish an ESOP solely for 
the benefit of the employees, their assertion is true. If management is also interested 
in the funds received from an equity issuance, however, the tax deductible payments 
must be considered an added benefit to the ESOP issuance process.
Regardless, Chaplinsky and Niehaus’ assumption leads to their conclusion that the 
ESOP-dividend policy and present value of the 50 percent "interest subsidy" (for 
leveraged ESOPs) are the only two determinants of the ESOP-related tax benefit. 
Moreover, based on their examination of 76 surveys returned by leveraged-ESOP firms, 
20 plans (26.3 percent) do not repay their ESOP loan with dividends paid on 
unallocated ESOP shares and 57 plans (75 percent) allow the dividends paid on 
allocated shares to accrue within the employees’ accounts. In other words, a large 
percentage of firms are forgoing the available tax benefits. Though the latter policy is 
probably employed to defer the personal taxes required on dividends paid directly to the 
employees (as a benefit to the employees), the results are used by the authors to support 
their argument that "ESOP plans do not appear to be operated to achieve the maximum
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corporate tax benefits." One cannot infer, however, that the tax benefits are irrelevant 
merely because the maximum level of tax benefit is not pursued by the firm. In other 
words, maximum tax benefits do not necessarily correlate to optimal firm values. This 
is particularly true for firms establishing a leveraged ESOP to obtain funds at a cheaper 
cost of capital because of the 50 percent interest subsidy.
Consistent with Chaplinsky and Niehaus is Scholes and Wolfson (1990), who assert 
that the costs associated with maintaining the trust may offset the potential tax benefits 
o f the ESOP. Combining the "cost" argument with the fact that some of the benefits 
are not unique to an employee stock ownership pension plan, the authors conclude that 
the tax provisions are not the primary reason for creating an ESOP. The authors 
further suggest that the anti-takeover aspects of the ESOP (as discussed in section 2.4) 
are the motivating force behind their establishment, not the "incentives" (section 2.3) 
they provide to the employees nor the tax benefits obtained by the firm.
The findings of Dhillon and Ramirez (1994) support the arguments of Scholes and 
Wolfson and Chaplinsky and Niehaus with their multiple regression results that 
demonstrate an insignificant relationship between the ESOP announcement’s prediction 
error and the firm’s marginal tax rate in the year prior to the ESOP. Though Dhillon 
and Ramirez argue that firms with a high tax rate should experience a larger tax 
benefit, and therefore a larger positive prediction error, their "tax benefit" proxy does 
not specifically account for the 50 percent interest subsidy attached to leveraged ESOPs 
established between 1984 and 1989. In other words, the authors implicitly assume that 
all ESOPs have homogeneous tax benefits. This is implied via the structure of their
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regression which suggests that the prior year’s marginal tax rate, not the ESOP 
structure (i.e., the presence or absence of the 50 percent subsidy), is the determinant 
of the market’s "tax effect" reaction.
In contrast to the above, Beatty (1995) specifically accounts for each firm’s ESOP- 
related tax benefit. For the 122 ESOP announcements analyzed, Beatty calculates a net 
tax benefit by accounting for the interest savings from a 50 percent interest income 
exclusion (for leveraged ESOPs) and the value of the dividend tax deduction. Other 
factors such as a firm’s net operating loss carryforward and its marginal tax rates also 
affect the net tax benefit calculation. By regressing the firms’ two-day cumulative 
prediction errors onto a set of explanatory variables, including the net tax benefit, the 
results suggest that the market’s reaction to the ESOP announcement is positively 
affected by the size of the net tax benefit.
In addition, Chang and Mayers (1992) claim that their results are consistent with 
the presence of an ESOP-related tax benefit. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the 
change in shareholder wealth is positively affected by the size of the ESOP. They 
suggest that this is consistent with the contention that an ESOP’s tax benefit enhances 
firm value. They also contend, however, that the results support the argument that 
ESOPs increase the employees’ motivation, and therefore enhance firm value.
2.3. Employee Motivation
A common explanation for the establishment o f an ESOP is the alignment of 
interests of the employee-owner with those of the outside shareholders. That is, many 
claim that ownership enhances a worker’s commitment to his/her job, thus increasing
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the overall work performance and firm value. Furthermore, the presence of an ESOP 
is believed to reduce employee turnover12 and an associated cost of hiring/training new 
employees. An increase in employee ownership may also improve the level of 
cooperation between the employees and management, an additional effect believed to 
improve the overall performance of the firm.
On the other hand, despite the potentially large block of ownership purchased by 
the ESOP, the individual allocation of shares to the employees may be minimal. 
Furthermore, an increase in an individual’s effort may not have a noticeable impact on 
the share price movement. Given these scenarios, the potential for a "free-rider" 
problem may offset any motivational increases in productivity.
Support for an ESOP’s enhancement of employee motivation is provided by a study 
performed by the National Center for Employee Ownership that documented the 
attitudes of 2,700 employees from 37 ESOP firms. The findings demonstrate a strong 
direct relationship between the level of employee ownership and commitment, 
satisfaction, and employee effort.
Though not necessarily a direct measure of an ESOP’s effect on employee 
motivation (and, correspondingly, the motivation’s effect on firm value), the 
examination of a firm’s operational performance subsequent to an ESOP has been 
analyzed by many. For example, Livingston and Henry (1980) compare several 
profitability ratios of ESOP firms to those of a control group of non-ESOP firms.
i2A s noted in Chang and Mayers (1992), legislation requires that the vesting o f  ESOP shares must 
occur within seven years o f participation if an incremental yearly vesting (percentage) is applied. If there 
are no yearly percentage increases, the full vesting must occur within five years. The incentive to 
become fully vested is hypothesized to reduce employee turnover.
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Their results infer that the ESOP firms had significantly lower profits despite an 
insignificant difference in several risk-related figures (e.g., liquidity, leverage, and 
variability). The authors conclude that "the costs of the plan outweigh the financial 
benefit to the firm." Similar inferences were produced in the 1987 report by the 
General Accounting Office (GAO) which documented the results of several studies that 
analyzed the performance effects of ESOPs established prior to 1981. The GAO report 
notes that the majority of studies were unable to support a belief that ESOPs have a 
significant effect on firm performance, as measured by various profitability, 
productivity, and growth statistics.
In contrast to the GAO findings, Rosen (1990) finds that ESOPs have a positive 
influence on the income growth of the firm. To be specific, Rosen compared the 
growth patterns (of 45 ESOP firms) of the five-year periods before and after the 
creation of the ESOP. After adjusting each time-frame for the performance levels of 
the firms’ competitors, the results lead the author to conclude that "the ESOP firms 
grew 3-4 percent faster (depending on the measure used) than they would have without 
an ESOP." It was further noted that the majority of this increase came from the 
companies that had a higher degree of employee input and participation in the decision­
making process.
Finally, a more recent "ESOP-productivity" study was performed by Mikkelson and 
Partch (1993). Though the authors’ analysis is an attempt to determine the relation 
between the change in managerial voting power (and their personal equity ownership) 
and the firm’s operating performance, they find that the sampled firms experience a
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subsequent belovv-normal operating income. Other recent studies (e.g., Chang and 
Mayers, 1992, and Beatty, 1995), through their regression of prediction errors onto 
proxies for employee incentive, have found mixed results in support of the contention 
that ESOPs enhance firm value with the increased motivation of employees. In sum, 
the diverse results found in the "motivational" studies are probably attributed to the 
extreme difficulty of determining an accurate measure of ESOP-related employee 
incentives.
2.4. ESOPS and Corporate Control
Recent ESOP literature has predominantly concentrated on the corporate control 
aspects affected by the creation o f an ESOP. As argued by Gordon and Pound (1990) 
in their analysis of ESOPs established in the presence and absence of takeover activity, 
because the employees typically dislike the option of their firm being taken over (in fear 
o f a subsequent layoff), all ESOP shares allocated to their account will be voted in 
opposition of a takeover (in favor of management). Furthermore, because many ESOP 
trusts are required to vote the unallocated shares in the same proportion as the allocated 
shares, it is assumed that the unallocated ESOP shares will also vote against a proposed 
takeover attempt that is opposed by management. For those trustees not required to 
vote "proportionally", it is assumed that they too will vote with management, a material 
source of their income. In sum, it is assumed that ESOPs effectively increase the 
percentage of votes controlled by management.
Supporters of the management entrenchment hypothesis would state that the 
assumed increase in the managers’ voting power has a negative impact on firm value
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because the outsider’s ownership influence and the probability of takeover are reduced. 
The negative impact is supposedly caused by the allowance of an increase in managerial 
perquisite consumption without retribution. In other words, an enlarged conflict of 
interest between management and the shareholders is one effect of an increase in the 
voting power of management.13 In contrast, the shareholder interests hypothesis 
predicts an increase in firm value when the managerial voting power is enhanced. This 
effect is predicted because the additional votes from the ESOP will be used by 
management to ensure a maximum takeover premium if a buyout ensues.
This "vote with management" assumption is particularly important to the significant 
percentage of ESOP firms incorporated in Delaware, a state which initiated a 
supermajority ("freeze-out") provision in December, 1987. The law effectively states 
that unless 85 percent of a firm’s nonaligned (i.e., non-insider) shares approve a 
potential takeover, the bidding firm is prohibited from engaging in any business 
combination with the target firm for a three-year period. Furthermore, ESOP shares 
are defined by Delaware law as "nonaligned", despite their often assumed voting 
allegiance to management.
A final important "control" event is the January 9, 1989 Delaware Court decision 
which upheld the increase in ownership (to 14 percent) by Polaroid’s ESOP despite the 
presence of takeover rumors (the ESOP was announced prior to the formal bid). Given
l3This should not be confused with the arguments o f Jensen and Meckling (1976), who contend that 
an increase in a manager’s personal (cash-flow) ownership aligns the interests o f  management and the 
shareholders. ESOPs increase managerial voting power, not cash-flow ownership.
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that 85 percent of the firm’s nonaligned shares must vote in favor of a takeover, 
Polaroid was able to effectively block a takeover attempt by Shamrock Holdings.
The ESOP literature reports fairly consistent results for the market’s reaction to an 
ESOP announced while a firm is subject to a takeover. For example, Gordon and 
Pound (1990) and Chang and Mayers (1992) find a significant negative market reaction 
to the announcement of an ESOP in the presence of a takeover threat. Furthermore, 
Beatty’s (1995) cross-sectional analysis documents a decrease in shareholder wealth for 
ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity.
In addition to the testing noted above, Gordon and Pound split their "takeover" 
group into pre- and post-Polaroid samples, and find a significant negative effect for 
both groupings. This latter finding, however, is in conflict with Dhillon and Ramirez 
(1994), who document a significant positive (significant negative) effect associated with 
the pre- (post-) Polaroid time-period. This also differs with Chaplinsky and Niehaus 
(1994), who find an insignificant positive prediction error in the post-Polaroid time- 
period. Dhillon and Ramirez suggest that the conflicting results are caused by sample- 
size differences. Nevertheless, the Polaroid decision is still considered a relevant event 
because it establishes the court’s allowance of an ESOP as a legitimate takeover 
defense.
Additional corporate control evidence is provided by Gordon and Pound, who 
document a negative wealth effect for announcements of ESOPs in which the level of 
ESOP votes and insider ownership shares is subsequently sufficient to veto a takeover 
proposal. "Sufficiency" was subjectively determined to be the level of ownership that
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
exceeds 95 percent of the votes necessary to prevent a takeover. The connection 
between the veto power and the negative prediction error is weakened, however, by the 
small sample size of ten. Similar to Gordon and Pound, Beatty (1995) uses a "95 
percent" veto cut-off when she regresses the ESOP firm’s prediction errors onto several 
variables, including an indicator variable used to account for firms that obtain veto 
power with the establishment of the ESOP. In contrast to Gordon and Pound’s results, 
an insignificant effect was associated with the "control change" variable.
Two closely related examinations of ESOPs and their effect on corporate control 
were presented by Chang and Mayers (1992) and Mikkelson and Partch (1993). Chang 
and Mayers contend that firms with a high level of managerial (insider) ownership may 
establish an ESOP, in conjunction with a percentage sell-off of the manager’s cash-flow 
equity, in order to maintain a level of entrenchment yet reduce the firm-specific risk 
assumed by management. Support for their argument is a significant correlation 
between the reduction in the percentage of insider ownership surrounding the 
announcement and the percentage increase in the number of ESOP shares. A detailed 
discussion of their inferences and the associated shortcomings is provided in chapter 5.
Chang and Mayers further assert that because of this ESOP establishment/insider 
sell-off relationship, the market interprets the ESOP announcement as a negative signal 
for firms with a high level of insider ownership. The negative effect is predicted 
because the market infers that there will be a reduction in the insider ownership of 
cash-flow claims without a corresponding loss of voting power. This combination leads 
to a reduction in the alignment of interests (between management and the shareholders)
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and an increase in the managers’ incentive to expand their consumption o f perquisites. 
In effect, an increase in agency costs without a corresponding decrease in entrenchment 
costs produce an overall negative effect. Despite the logic, Chang and Mayers’ 
empirical support for such a contention is relatively weak, as discussed in chapter 5.
2.5. Summary
Three reasons frequently given for the creation of an ESOP are to take advantage 
of special tax benefits, to motivate employees, and to secure management’s control of 
the firm. Empirical studies report mixed support for the first two, suggesting that these 
benefits, if real, are offset by other costs associated with the ESOP. Empirical research 
into management’s self-interests and the establishment o f an ESOP is more consistent, 
particularly with respect to ESOPs that seemingly entrench management. In this light, 
the three essays of this dissertation pursue different aspects of the relations between 
management’s own interests and the establishment of an ESOP.
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Chapter 3 
Essay One: Asymmetric Information
3.1. Introduction
Though asymmetric information is a common theory used to explain the market’s 
reaction to a security issuance announcement, this explanation has only been lightly 
applied to the shareholder wealth effects associated with the announcement o f an ESOP 
and the underlying security issue. Such is the purpose of this chapter. To be specific, 
this essay asserts that for most ESOP announcements, the type of security and source 
of funds used by the employee stock ownership trust to purchase the security, and the 
corresponding asymmetric information implications, are the dominant factors 
influencing the market’s reaction to an ESOP announcement. Furthermore, for ESOP 
formations involving a cash inflow to the corporation, the use of the funds received 
from the ESOP will also affect the market’s reaction. This is particularly true for 
ESOP firms that simultaneously announce that the funds will be used to repurchase a 
block of the firm’s common stock.
In sum, the market is not truly reacting to the ESOP announcement, per se, but to 
the underlying structure (i.e., the type/source/use) of its formation. Furthermore, 
because ESOP-related security transactions affect the firm’s employees in a more direct 
manner than comparable non-ESOP transactions, the market’s perception of firm value 
will differ between the two. This latter contention is the foundation of a revised 
interpretation of the asymmetric information hypothesis and its explanation o f the 
market’s reaction to the securities issuance structure of an announced ESOP.
23
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Prior to the specifics, a brief explanation of the traditional asymmetric information 
argument, and a proposed revision to it, will be discussed. A description of the data, 
method o f analysis, and results follow the traditional and revised asymmetric 
information sections. Concluding remarks are provided at the end of this chapter.
3.1.1. The Traditional Asymmetric Inform ation Argument
The asymmetric information hypothesis, and several closely associated signalling 
models, can be attributed to the problems (outlined in Akerlof, 1970) caused by a 
difference in information possessed by buyers (investors) and sellers (management). 
To be specific, the often referred to "lemons problem" occurs when the seller possesses 
private information about the product being sold (the firm’s common stock). Because 
the buyer is not privy to this critical information, he or she is unable to differentiate 
between the quality of products that outwardly appear to be equal. Without 
differentiation, a pooling process occurs, and the buyer’s offer price becomes an 
average of the visibly similar products. Since sellers will receive an average price for 
their product regardless of the quality, profit is maximized by producing a low-quality, 
low-cost product. Therefore, without the buyer’s ability to differentiate the quality 
(and, therefore, "true" price) of a product, the motivation to sell a high-quality product 
is eliminated.
Signalling models address this problem by suggesting that firms with high-quality 
products are able to garner a higher price through a process that signals the true value 
of the product. The signal creates a separating equilibrium and allows the buyers to 
differentiate between low- and high-quality products. A similar argument is made that
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managers will signal that their firm’s stock price is undervalued when the market is 
unaware of the positive private information the managers possess. This latter 
contention is the foundation of this essay.
The process of overcoming the lemons problem via signalling is modelled by many 
(e.g., Spence, 1973, Leland and Pyle, 1977, Ross, 1977, Bhattacharya, 1979, Miller 
and Rock, 1985, and Myers and Majluf, 1984). The core of the asymmetric 
information hypothesis is the assumption that managers are sole possessors of detailed 
information about the firm’s future cash flows and, therefore, the true firm value. The 
market, aware of this private information process, attempts to infer a firm’s true value 
from the decisions made (and publicly announced) by management. For example, Ross 
(1977) asserts that a firm that announces an increase in leverage implies to the market 
that managers possess private information about favorable future cash flows. In other 
words, the increase in leverage implies that management believes the firm has ample 
cash flows to cover the increase in debt-related obligations. Thus, an implied cash-flow 
increase causes the market to revalue the firm upward.
A second example of how a firm’s private information is released to the market is 
provided by the dividend models of Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985). 
Similar to the arguments in Ross, optimistic future cash flows are implied when a firm 
announces an increase in its dividend payout. The increased payout signals to the 
market that future cash flows are sufficient to meet the firm’s future dividend (and debt) 
obligations. Once again, the positive inference leads to an upward revaluation o f the 
firm. It should also be noted that Miller and Rock’s cash-flow model suggests that all
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security issuances are taken as a negative signal that the firm’s cash flows are 
insufficient to cover future dividend and debt obligations.
Because this essay examines the "structure" of the ESOP, it focuses on the value 
of a firm inferred by the market by the type of security issue offered by the firm. A 
Myers and Majluf (1984) approach is, therefore, applied to the ESOP analyses. Like 
most signalling models, Myers and Majluf’s model assumes that managers know the 
true value of their firm because they are privy to a more accurate (and larger) set of 
information about the firm’s future cash flows. Though their model addresses the 
potentially conflicting signals of an announced new project and the related financing, 
the model can be interpreted as suggesting that there exists a private information 
process that guides the security offering decisions of the firm. It is further assumed 
that the market is aware of this process, and uses the manager’s decision to infer the 
true value of the firm. The authors also contend that the inference is guided by the 
market’s acknowledgement of the fact that when a firm needs capital (to fund a 
project), the manager’s concern for the existing shareholders will determine the type of 
security issued by the firm.
One application of this theory is the belief that firms with negative private 
information prefer to obtain funds through the issuance of common stock. It is further 
assumed that the issuance of an overvalued equity is transacted to benefit the firm’s 
existing shareholders. Aware of this process, the market infers from the issuance 
announcement that the equity is overpriced and therefore adjusts the stock’s price 
downward. Empirical support is provided by the market’s significant negative average
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reaction to the announcement of seasoned common stock issuances (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986, Masulis and Korwar, 1986, and Mikkelson and Partch, 1986).
In contrast, Chang and Mayers (1992) find a significant positive mean excess return 
(of 0.94 percent) for the announcement of new common shares purchased by the ESOP. 
Their analysis, however, fails to separately examine ESOPs established in the presence 
and absence of takeover activity, and also ignores the effects of simultaneous security 
transactions and "source of fund" factors.14 A separate analysis of ESOPs announced 
in the presence of takeover activity is necessary because the "asymmetric" signal is 
eliminated by the market’s belief that managerial entrenchment is the purpose of the 
ESOP (to be discussed in the second essay). It is further argued that the effects of 
simultaneous security transactions must also be accounted for. For example, despite 
the notable differences, the following ESOP announcements would all be categorized 
by Chang and Mayers as a previously unissued common stock transaction:
1) The ESOP uses pension plan surplus funds (source) to purchase newly issued 
common stock (type) and convertible preferred shares (type) from the firm.
2) The ESOP purchases newly issued common stock (type) from the firm with the funds 
from a bank loan (source) (defined as a leveraged ESOP) that is guaranteed by the firm. 
The firm also announces that it will repurchase shares on the open market (use) to 
offset the dilution.
“ Based on a Leland and Pyle (1977) argument, failure to account for simultaneous transactions is 
particularly important when the presence o f  repurchased equity is considered. Leland and Pyle contend 
that managers privy to positive firm-specific information do not want to dilute their percentage o f cash­
flow ownership. A simultaneous repurchase o f equity prevents such a dilution and, therefore, implies 
positive information about the true value o f the firm. Conversely, an ESOP structured with common 
stock and no simultaneous repurchase lacks this positive implication.
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3) The ESOP purchases common stock {type) from the firm in conjunction with the 
establishment of a loan from the firm {source). Furthermore, the ESOP was established 
in the presence of takeover activity.
To demonstrate the potential magnitude of this problem, a comparable non-ESOP 
analysis would categorize both equity-for-debt exchanges and seasoned common stock 
offerings as "previously unissued" events. A pooling of these distinct events is more 
than likely unacceptable in financial research. Regardless, a result that is probably 
related to this pooled classification is that even though the ESOP/common stock 
findings are statistically significant and positive, only 48 percent of Chang and Mayers’ 
previously unissued sample exhibits a positive prediction error. Therefore, as noted in 
the introduction of this section, one purpose o f this analysis is to account for these 
categorical differences with a "type/source/use" examination.
A Myers and Majluf interpretation has also been applied to non-ESOP repurchases 
of common stock, bank loans, and convertible preferred issue announcements. For 
example, a repurchase of common stock announcement implies to the market that 
management believes the security is sufficiently underpriced, thus inducing the market 
to adjust the price of the equity upward. This prediction is supported by Dann (1981) 
and Vermaelen (1981) for open market repurchases and tender offer repurchases 
(significant excess returns of approximately 3 percent and 15 percent, respectively). 
The larger positive reactions to the tender offer repurchases are hypothesized by 
Vermaelen to be caused by the sizable premium offered and the typically larger number 
of shares repurchased in a tender offer.
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In the analysis of ESOP-related repurchases, Chang and Mayers find a significant 
positive effect for open market repurchases and tender offer repurchases (1.17 percent 
and 3.5 percent mean excess returns, respectively). In addition, they find an 
insignificant -0.30 percent reaction to the announcement of firms repurchasing equity 
from a target shareholder (non-takeover related). Similar to the problems in the 
ESOP/common stock analysis noted above, the effects of additional securities and 
sources of funds that may be associated with an ESOP "repurchase" announcement are 
not separated by the authors. Moreover, they do not separately examine the market’s 
reaction to ESOP repurchases announced in the presence and absence of takeover 
activity. One potentially related effect is Chang and Mayers’ finding that only 56 
percent of the sample of open market repurchases had a positive prediction error, a 
statistically insignificant result.
With its establishment, an ESOP commonly incurs private debt (typically a bank 
loan) as the source of funds used to purchase the common or convertible equity. 
Leveraged ESOPs were particularly popular after the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act, 
which allowed for the deduction of 50 percent of the interest income received by the 
lender. The favorable tax treatment often resulted in a loan at a rate below prime.
For non-ESOP bank loan announcements, the asymmetric information hypothesis 
asserts that managers possess positive information that can not be directly disclosed to 
the public market. One version of this hypothesis asserts that direct disclosure would 
not be credible. Alternatively, Campbell (1979) assumes that managers possess positive 
private information that would be highly beneficial to the firm’s competitors. A public
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revelation of the information would therefore be harmful to shareholder wealth. As 
suggested by Campbell, Diamond (1984), and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), a 
private information processor (e.g., a bank) is necessary to determine the correct cost 
o f capital without a public release of the valuable private information. The market 
infers from the private debt announcement that the equity is underpriced and reacts 
accordingly. The significant positive market responses to bank loan announcements 
found in James (1987), Lummer and McConnell (1989), and Slovin, Johnson, and 
Glascock (1992) support these contentions.
With respect to ESOPs and private debt, Chang and Mayers report that their 151 
leveraged and 125 non-leveraged ESOPs produce significant positive average excess 
returns of 0.80 percent and 0.65 percent, respectively. Given that the results are not 
significantly different from each other despite the tax benefit differences, and the fact 
that only 54 percent and 50 percent of the samples had a positive prediction error, the 
exclusion of the additional simultaneous transactions (i.e., absence/presence of 
takeover, "type", and "use") in Chang and Mayers’ analysis is noteworthy.
Finally, for non-ESOP convertible preferred issues, the asymmetric information 
hypothesis argues that the market infers that the degree o f negative private information 
is insufficient to cause management to issue common stock. On the other hand, the 
market also infers that the managers do not possess a level of positive private 
information necessary to induce a bank loan agreement. Therefore, a market reaction 
between that of a bank loan and common stock announcement is predicted (Smith, 
1986). One could further argue that the effect is more likely to be negative because the
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non-zero probability of a subsequent common stock conversion implies an overpriced 
equity. Linn and Pinegar’s (1988) significant finding of a -1.4 percent average excess 
return to the announcement of a non-ESOP convertible preferred stock issue is 
consistent with these asymmetric information predictions.
For ESOP-related convertible preferred announcements, Chang and Mayers’ 
findings of an insignificant -0.32 percent average prediction error do not refute the 
asymmetric information hypothesis. Once again, the presence/absence o f a takeover 
and "source/type/use" classifications are not separated and therefore may underlie the 
insignificant result.
It should finally be noted that Beatty (1995) briefly mentions that her results support 
an ESOP/asymmetric information connection. Beatty regresses the cumulative 
prediction errors of 122 ESOP firms onto numerous variables, including two 
independent variables that account for the size (calculated as a percentage of shares 
outstanding) of the newly issued common stock and convertible preferred equity, if 
any.15 Beatty asserts that the significant negative coefficients attached to these 
variables support the asymmetric information hypothesis. The results, however, appear 
to be in conflict with a similar regression performed by Chang and Mayers, who 
document an insignificant coefficient attached to their convertible preferred explanatory 
variable. Though an independent variable for common stock is excluded from their 
sample, Chang and Mayers’ event study analysis produces significant positive 
(insignificant) results for the sample of ESOPs structured with common stock
15It should also be noted that Beatty does not control for the role o f repurchased equity. ESOPs 
structured with repurchased equity account for 56 percent o f her sample, however.
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(convertible preferred equity). In terms of Beatty’s argument, these results do not 
support the traditional asymmetric information hypothesis on securities issuances.
In brief, the predictions of the traditional version of the asymmetric information 
hypothesis are not well met in studies of ESOPs. In contrast to the predicted negative 
reaction, the market’s response to ESOP-related issuances of common stock is positive. 
ESOP repurchases generate a smaller positive response than non-ESOP repurchases. 
And the use of private debt to leverage an ESOP is associated with a positive response 
as predicted. The relevance of this latter consistency is weakened, however, by the 
comparable positive reaction to ESOPs structured without private debt. Finally, the 
choice o f convertible preferred stock for the ESOP generates a non-significant market 
response, not the negative reaction predicted and observed elsewhere. Thus, the 
magnitude and direction of the market’s response to an ESOP transaction often times 
differ from those predicted by the asymmetric information hypothesis. A further 
stratification of the ESOP structure is examined to explain these differences.
3.1.2. The Revised Asymmetric Information Hypothesis
The revised interpretation is based on two theories. The first theory, as outlined 
in section 2.3, states that ESOPs are established to align the interests of the employees 
with those of the shareholders (i.e., established to motivate the employees). The 
second theory asserts that a firm’s securities issuance decision is used by the market to 
infer the true value of the firm (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
The Myers and Majluf adverse selection model is founded on the assumptions that 
managers have superior information and that their decisions are made in a manner that
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benefits the firm’s existing shareholders. In comparison to this ("traditional") 
asymmetric information hypothesis, the revised hypothesis contends that the manager’s 
decisions are not only made on behalf of the existing shareholders, but the employees 
and managers as well. For typical (i.e., non-ESOP) security issuance announcements, 
the predicted traditional asymmetric information results are unchanged by this expanded 
assumption. That is, the manager’s concern for the welfare of the employees does not 
affect the predicted market reaction because equity is not specifically distributed to the 
employees. Conversely, for security issuance announcements that involve a substantial 
distribution (or contingent distribution [e.g., executive options]) of shares to the 
managers, employees, or a representative trust, the predicted results are altered by the 
revised hypothesis.
In comparison to the Myers and Majluf predictions, the revised hypothesis asserts 
that managers will not issue an overpriced security when the purchasers are the 
employees of the firm. The foundation of this assertion is the fact that the equity 
distribution to the employees is typically meant to "motivate the work-force." Given 
the many available forms of an employee benefit, compensating the workers with an 
overvalued equity runs counter to the overall objective of the equity distribution. That 
is, given the additional assumption that the welfare of the employees affects a subset 
of managerial decisions, it is logical to infer that the establishment of a firm’s equity- 
based compensation plan does not involve an overvalued security.
Applying the revised hypothesis to an equity-based compensation plan is consistent 
with the Leland and Pyle (1977) argument, in that a positive signal should be inferred
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by the market because the employees are incurring additional firm-specific risk 
(typically) without additional compensation. Assuming the employees/managers are 
rational, the market concludes that the managers possess a sufficient degree of positive 
private information to offset the added risk the ESOP imposes on their employees. If 
the additional risk were not offset, the motivational effect would be diminished and the 
firm’s performance would therefore be adversely affected. Thus, the revised hypothesis 
is consistent with an extension of Leland and Pyle because it states that the changes in 
the employees’ firm-specific risk, in addition to the managers’ firm-specific risk (as 
they argue), are recognized by the market.
Research supportive of the revised asymmetric information argument is provided 
by Bhagat, Brickley, and Lease (1985), who find a significant positive excess return 
associated with the announcement of a stock purchase plan and an insignificant market 
reaction to the announcement of an IRS 423 plan. These are plans in which the firm’s 
managers and employees are given the option to purchase the stock of their employer, 
often at a discount (for IRS 423 plans) or with the aid of a company loan (for stock 
purchase plans). The authors conclude from the insignificant reaction (to the IRS 423 
announcement) that the plan is simply meant to raise capital for the firm. If true, one 
would expect that the affect on shareholder wealth should be comparable to that of a 
seasoned equity offering. Based on the differences in the market’s reaction, the results 
are consistent with the revised asymmetric information assumption that the market 
believes that management does not want to compensate their employees with an 
overpriced security.
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To summarize, the revised hypothesis states that the market’s reaction to an ESOP 
announcement is partially guided by the private information implied by the type of 
security purchased by the ESOP. In addition, the market assumes that the manager’s 
security issuance decision is made with the employees’ (and manager’s) welfare in 
mind. Therefore, unlike a Myers and Majluf prediction of a negative market reaction, 
a common stock ESOP announcement is predicted to produce a non-negative 
shareholder wealth effect. This is due to the belief that in order to maintain or improve 
the level of employee motivation, management does not want to compensate the work­
force with an overpriced security.
Also in contrast with Myers and Majluf is the contention that a convertible 
preferred ESOP announcement implies a level of negative asymmetric information 
because the managers are unwilling to fund the ESOP with the firm’s (overpriced) 
common stock. Therefore, the revised hypothesis predicts that an ESOP structured with 
convertible preferred stock should produce a larger negative market reaction than a 
common stock ESOP, a prediction exactly opposite to that of the traditional asymmetric 
information argument. Finally, the revised hypothesis predicts a positive reaction to 
"repurchased" and "leveraged" ESOPs, based on arguments comparable to the 
traditional asymmetric information contentions.
3.2. ESOP/Asymmetric Information Hypotheses
Because prior research does not stratify ESOPs by the presence/absence of a 
takeover and the "source/type/use" structure of the ESOP, its findings can not be used 
to support a revised asymmetric information explanation of the market’s reaction. In
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other words, some prior results may be diluted by the failure to segregate the 
presence/absence of takeover activity, while other findings are statistically significant 
solely because of the presence of additional structural elements (e.g., repurchases, 
leverage, etc.). For example, the pooling of takeover and non-takeover ESOPs 
structured with repurchased equity may have a smaller documented reaction than the 
effects noted from separate analyses of "repurchased" ESOPs announced in the presence 
and absence o f takeover activity. In other words, the announcement of an ESOP 
structured with repurchased equity will have a significant positive (negative) market 
reaction in the absence (presence) of takeover activity, two results that counteract each 
other when analyzed on an aggregate basis.
A second example is Chang and Mayers’ results suggesting that ESOPs structured 
with previously unissued common stock have a significant positive effect on shareholder 
wealth. Though they argue that the results are consistent with a private equity issue 
(despite the absence of an external monitor), the revised hypothesis asserts that the 
positive results are driven by a sample in which a high percentage of the 
ESOP/common stock structures include a repurchase of equity announcement. Given 
the above, the purpose of the following analysis is to provide support for the revised 
asymmetric information explanation of the market’s reaction to an ESOP announcement 
by examining the various "presence/absence of takeover" and "type/source/use" 
combinations. The specific hypotheses (expressed as expected results) are as follows:
1) Firms that announce an ESOP structured with repurchased equity (in the absence 
of takeover activity) will experience positive gains in shareholder wealth.
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2) ESOPs structured with private debt (i.e., leveraged ESOPs) will also infer positive 
private information to the market, thus causing the firms’ values to be revalued 
upwards.
The first two contentions are consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis, 
which states that the market infers that management believes that their firm’s equity is 
undervalued. The undervalued inference results in an increase in shareholder wealth 
on the day of the announcement.
3) A non-negative market reaction is predicted for firms that announce an ESOP 
structured with common stock (in the absence of takeover).
4) The effect on firm value from an announcement that the ESOP will purchase 
convertible preferred equity will be more negative than that of an ESOP/common stock 
effect.
Hypotheses 3) and 4), the result of a revised asymmetric information argument, are 
exactly opposite to the predictions made by the traditional asymmetric information 
hypothesis. The reversal is predicted because of the belief that ESOPs are meant to 
motivate the employees. Since funding the ESOP trust with an overpriced common 
stock is counter to this objective, the market will not infer negative private information 
when the common stock ESOP is announced. A more negative reaction is expected for 
ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity because it implies to the market that 
management did not want to sell the ESOP an overpriced common stock.
The fifth hypothesis predicts that the information inferred by the securities issuance 
structure is overshadowed by the presence of takeover activity and anti-takeover 
(entrenchment) implications of the ESOP. To be specific:
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5) ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity, regardless of structure, infer 
to the market that management intends to fight the takeover. This, in combination with 
the effectiveness of an ESOP as a deterrent,16 causes a downward revaluation of the 
firm.
3.2.1. Firm Size, ESOP Size, and Asymmetric Information Hypotheses
This section will outline the hypothesized effects that firm size and ESOP size have 
on the level of asymmetric information implied by the announcement. In regards to 
firm size, many believe that large firms have an increased number of external monitors 
analyzing the value of the firm. It is also assumed that an enlarged number of monitors 
translates into a smaller degree of asymmetric information and, therefore, a smaller 
price reaction when an action of management (e.g., ESOP establishment) is announced. 
Atiase (1985) similarly argues for a connection between firm size and the degree of 
private information possessed by the firm. Atiase asserts that due to the inherent 
structure of gathering and processing information about a firm, an effect exists (similar 
to an economy of scale effect) where the gathering/processing of "large firm" 
information has a lower average cost than that of a small firm. In other words, it is 
more expensive (less profitable) to monitor/analyze the activities of a smaller firm. 
This correlates to a lower number of external monitors, a higher degree of asymmetric
16Chaplinsky and Niehaus (1994) document that 20 o f the 42 (48 percent) "takeover" ESOPs they 
reviewed experienced a change in management. In comparison, 102 o f 120 (85 percent) non-ESOP 
targets were successfully taken over. The difference in percentages is statistically significant at the one 
percent level. See chapter 4, essay 2, for additional ESOP anti-takeover (entrenchment) and corporate 
control implications.
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information, and therefore a larger market reaction when a small firm announcement 
is made.
In support of these contentions, Pugh and Jahera (1990), in their attempt to explain 
the magnitude of the market’s reaction to tender offer announcements, find that the 
excess returns are inversely related to firm size. This evidence supports the belief that 
a smaller degree of information is conveyed by actions taken by larger firms. 
Similarly, Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990) calculate the excess returns of large and 
small firms for the two years following a tender offer announcement. Support for the 
assertion that small-firm announcements provide a stronger signal o f firm value is 
provided by their findings of statistically significant (insignificant) positive returns for 
the small (large) firms.
Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) also support the firm size/market reaction 
arguments. By separating their sample into small and large firms, the authors 
demonstrate that the share value o f small firms is significantly enhanced when new and 
renewal bank loans are announced. Conversely, the large-firm effects are insignificant 
for the new and renewal announcements.
In contrast to the empirical research noted above, the "firm size'VESOP analyses 
will be structured differently. To be specific, it is argued that the magnitude of the 
market’s reaction and the size of the ESOP firm are negatively related. Magnitude is 
stressed because prior ESOP studies have shown that certain ESOP stratifications 
produce significant positive cumulative prediction errors (e.g., ESOPs structured with 
repurchased equity), while others create significant and negative market reactions (e.g.,
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ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity). To correct for a potential 
pooling effect, the magnitude (i.e., absolute value) of the market’s reaction, not the 
cumulative prediction errors (CPEs), is regressed onto a firm-size variable. Consistent 
with the asymmetric information argument, an inverse relationship is predicted.
If the absolute value contention is neglected, the predicted positive and negative 
market reactions will offset each other when the relation between the size of the firm 
and its cumulative prediction errors is examined. Chang and Mayers (1992) fall into 
this trap when they regress the ESOP firms’ CPEs onto four slightly altered sets of 
twenty-plus explanatory variables, each including the log of equity capitalization as a 
proxy for firm size. Though the significant negative association between the proxy and 
the prediction error is supportive of the firm-size effect for positive prediction errors 
(i.e., small firms have larger positive prediction errors), the regression analysis falls 
short when intuitively applied to negative prediction errors. To be specific, the 
asymmetric information application of the firm-size effect further predicts that the 
magnitude of the negative prediction errors is larger for small firms, an expectation in 
conflict with Chang and Mayers’ regression results. Their findings suggest that large 
negative CPEs are associated with large firms, not small firms (that possess a 
hypothesized high level of asymmetric information). Therefore, to correct for this 
problem, the absolute value of the CPE should be used in such regressions.
It is further suggested that the degree of the asymmetric information implied by a 
firm’s announcement is affected by the size of the security issue (calculated as a 
percentage of total market value). For example, Ross (1977) suggests that a sizeable
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increase in leverage implies a substantial increase in future cash flows because 
considerable cash flows are necessary to pay for the increase in debt obligations. In 
contrast, a Miller and Rock (1985) interpretation suggests that a larger security issuance 
implies that management believes the firm has insufficient future earnings to cover 
future dividend distributions and debt obligations. Though the direction o f Ross’ and 
Miller and Rock’s predicted effects on shareholder value is in conflict, both predictions 
argue for a positive relation between the size of the issue and the magnitude of the 
market’s announcement-day reaction.
Empirical support for the positive relation between the security issuance size and 
the effect on firm value is extensive. For example, Masulis (1980) and Vermaelen 
(1981) find a direct relationship between the size of a tender offer repurchase and the 
magnitude of the positive excess return. In addition, Dann (1981) and Vermaelen 
(1981) contend that because tender offer repurchases typically involve a higher 
percentage of the firm’s outstanding equity than that of an open market repurchase, a 
significantly larger excess return is documented for the tender offers. In connection 
with the asymmetric information hypothesis, the results suggest that a greater 
commitment of repurchased equity provides a stronger positive inference o f future price 
performance. A final example is provided by the results noted in Mikkelson and Partch 
(1986). Their examination of seasoned equity offerings finds that the announcement- 
day decrease in shareholder wealth has a direct relationship with the size of the issue. 
That is, they note that the larger the size of the offering, the greater the negative 
cumulative excess return.
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In sum, it is predicted that the magnitude of private information inferred by the 
ESOP-related security issue and the size of the ESOP are positively related. Once 
again, because of the various factors that produce positive and negative prediction 
errors, the magnitude (i.e., absolute value) of the price reaction must be used, not the 
cumulative prediction error. Finally, (as will be noted in section 3.3.3) the ESOP size 
and firm size factors are analyzed in unison to determine their relationship with the 
magnitude of the stock price reaction. The final two ESOP/asymmetric information 
hypotheses are specified as follows:
6) A significant negative relationship between firm size and the absolute value of the 
cumulative excess return is predicted.
7) A significant positive relationship between ESOP size and the absolute value of the 
cumulative excess return is predicted.
3.3. Data and Method of Analysis
3.3.1. Data Description
The sample consists of 204 NYSE/AMEX and 115 Nasdaq17 ESOPs announced 
between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 1993. An initial sample of 458 firms was 
gathered from a Nexis Newswire search of ESOP-related press releases. To reduce 
contamination, firms with a simultaneous non-ESOP announcement (e.g., dividend 
change, quarterly earnings, and shareholder rights announcements) were excluded from 
the sample. To further detect contamination, a firm-specific search of the Wall Street
17NYSE =  New York Stock Exchange; AMEX =  American Stock Exchange; and Nasdaq =  
National Association o f Securities Dealers Automated Quotation system.
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Journal Index (WSJI) was performed to locate significant events around the ESOP 
announcement. Firms with material announcements in the three-day period surrounding 
the ESOP event were deleted from the initial sample. Finally, firms with an inadequate 
number of CRSP (Center for Research in Security Prices) daily returns were deleted 
from the initial sample.
To determine whether takeover activity is present, the WSJI was reviewed for 
takeover-related articles printed within the one-year period prior to the ESOP 
announcement.18 In addition, a Nexis Newswire press release search by firm name and 
keywords "takeover" and "buyout" was performed to detect takeover activity in the year 
preceding the announcement. Finally, the press release announcements were reviewed 
to determine the securities issuance structures of the ESOPs.
Descriptive statistics on ESOP-size and firm-size (Table 1), the distribution of 
ESOP structures by year (Tables 2 and 3), and the distribution of ESOPs by SIC code 
(Table 4) are provided for informative purposes. The more notable values of Table 1 
are found by comparing the sample of 60 takeover-related ESOPs to the 255 non­
takeover firms. In particular, the dollar value and percentage size of the ESOP appear 
to be larger for firms announcing ESOPs in the presence of takeover activity.19 These 
results are, therefore, consistent with the argument that the managers of "takeover" 
firms are more concerned with increasing their level of entrenchment.
'“Basing the takeover stratification on a review o f  the one-year period prior to the ESOP 
announcement is consistent with the methods employed by Chang and Mayers (1992).
'’The mean (median) dollar value o f  the ESOP is $114,083,000 ($38,720,000) for takeover ESOPs, 
and $68,424,000 ($10,000,000) for non-takeover ESOPs. Similar results are found for "ESOP-size", 
a variable equal to the ESOP’s value divided by firm value. For the ESOP dollar value variable, there 
is a .078 (.018) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means 
t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). For ESOP size, the corresponding difference-of-means probabilities are 
.603 (.286).
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Table 1
Sample statistics for all firms announcing the establishment of an ESOP between 
1980 and 1993.
M kt
V alue1
ESO P
V alue
E SO P
Size1
N M ean M edian M ean M edian M ean M edian
Total 315J 1515320 185666 76867 12900 .087 .056
Tkvr 60 1420666 217713 114083 38720 .094 .064
Non-tkvr =  NT 255 1537591 170713 68424 10000 .085 .052
Repurch (NT) 181 1570561 196781 72107 9500 .066 .049
Non-Rep (NT) 74 1456949 129792 60407 11429 .127 .066
CS 85 2084084 279562 85997 18000 .097 .059
CS Rep (NT) 39 2877657 360101 107878 32220 .085 .073
CS Non-Rep (NT) 46 1411273 222128 67764 14500 .106 .055
CPS 33 3639194 1481175 204204 125000 .100 .081
CPS Rep (NT) 25 3222292 1449471 183225 140000 .096 .084
CPS Non-Rep (NT) 8 4942014 3444356 112164 75000 .116 .055
LE 94 2662349 468898 120528 33075 .090 .066
LE Rep (NT) 65 2408275 579231 222264 31100 .077 .059
LE Non-Rep (NT) 29 3231825 354660 122530 44000 .116 .074
data) on the day o f  the announcement.
2  ESOP Size =  ESOP value ($000s) (per press release) divided by the market value o f  the firm.
3 Four o f  the 319 firms in the overall sample were deleted because o f insufficient market value data. 
T k v r =  Takeover.
N T =  Non-takeover =  ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
R ep  =  R ep u rch  =  ESOPs structured with repurchased equity.
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
Cl’S =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity.
L E  =  Leveraged ESOPs.
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Table 2
Distribution of ESOPs, and their structures, by year.
Y ear Total T kvr N on-tkvr CS CPS R epurch L E
1980 6 0 6 1 0 4 1
1981 2 0 2 0 0 2 0
1982 4 1 3 2 0 3 0
1983 2 0 2 1 0 0 0
1984 18 0 18 4 0 15 1
1985 22 5 17 9 0 14 5
1986 6 1 5 0 0 4 1
1987 41 14 27 13 1 29 15
1988 43 12 31 18 2 26 21
1989 95 24 71 35 37 66 51
1990 58 2 56 18 10 38 20
1991 10 1 9 1 2 9 3
1992 5 0 5 2 0 3 0
1993 7 0 7 3 0 6 2
Total 319 60 259 107 52 219 120
% o f 
Total
100 18.8 81.2 33.5 16.3 68.7 37.6
T k v r =  ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity. 
N on-tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the absence of takeover activity. 
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock. 
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock. 
R epurch =  ESOPs structured with repurchased equity.
L E  =  Leveraged ESOPs.
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Table 3
Distribution of non-takeover ESOP structures by year.
Year Total R epurch CS CPS LE
1980 6 4 1 0 1
1981 2 2 0 0 0
1982 3 2 1 0 0
1983 2 0 1 0 0
1984 18 15 4 0 1
1985 17 10 8 0 5
1986 5 4 0 0 0
1987 27 21 7 0 8
1988 31 21 11 0 14
1989 71 52 28 23 40
1990 56 37 18 9 20
1991 9 8 1 1 3
1992 5 3 2 0 0
1993 7 6 3 0 2
Total 259 185 85 33 94
R epurch =  ESOPs structured with repurchased equity.
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock. 
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity.
L E  =  Leveraged ESOPs.
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Table 4
Distribution o f ESOP sample by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code.
SIC* T kvr Non-
T kvr
R epurch CS CPS L E Total % o f 
Total
1000 2 7 3 5 2 3 9 2.8
2000 18 32 37 22 15 27 50 15.7
3000 17 81 69 26 16 29 98 30.7
4000 4 27 20 16 2 16 31 9.7
5000 3 19 14 8 6 9 22 6.9
6000 12 72 61 21 10 30 84 26.3
7000 4 13 9 8 1 5 17 5.3
8000 0 8 6 1 0 1 8 2.5
9000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 60 259 219 107 52 120 319 100
T kvr =  ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity. 
R epurch =  ESOPs structured with repurchased equity.
CS =  ESOPs structured with common stock.
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity.
LE  =  Leveraged ESOPs.
1 Source: CRSP.
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Tables 2 and 3 indicate that employee stock ownership plans cluster in the 1987- 
1990 period, with 74.3 percent of the ESOP sample being initiated in these years. 
Moreover, 107 of the 120 (89.2 percent) ESOPs structured with leverage (Table 2) 
were initiated in this period. Increased takeover activity, the acknowledgement of 
ESOPs as a takeover deterrent, and the ESOP-related tax benefits are the often cited 
reasons for the ESOP’s popularity in this period. Table 2 also exhibits that 47 of 52 
(90.4 percent) convertible preferred ESOPs were established in the 1989-1990 period. 
Explanation of this "convertible preferred" observation is unknown. Finally, Table 4 
reveals that 30.7 percent and 26.3 percent of the ESOP sample are firms in the 
Manufacturing Industries (SIC =  3000) and Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (SIC 
=  6000) businesses, respectively. Given the sizable number of firms with SICs of 
3000 and 6000, ESOP concentration in these categories is not irregular.
3.3.2. Method of Analysis (Revised Asymmetric Information)
Based on Brown and Warner (1985), a standard event study is used to calculate the 
market model prediction errors. For the 120-day estimation period (t=-135, -16; 
where t= 0  represents the press release date), individual daily returns are regressed onto 
the corresponding equal-weighted daily market index returns20 to calculate the least- 
squares market model parameters. The formal model is defined as:
Rn  = aj + P A , . , + h t  (1)
“Daily returns are provided by the CRSP files.
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where:
Rjt, =  rate of return for security j on day t,
R^, =  rate of return for the market index on day t,
, =  error term for security j on day t,
Oj =  intercept,
ify =  slope, or security j ’s sensitivity to Rm t.
Each firm ’s market model parameter estimates (a  and #) are then used in 
conjunction with the daily event window (t=  -15, +15) market returns to calculate each 
firm’s daily expected return. For each day in the event window, an individual firm’s
prediction error is calculated as the difference between the firm’s actual and expected
daily return. Therefore, firm j ’s daily prediction error is calculated as:
where:
PEj t =  firm j ’s prediction error on day t,
aj =  intercept estimate,
j&j =  slope estimate,
The average prediction error (APE) for all firms on day t is:
PEU = Ru -  + W (2)
(3)
where N is the number of firms in the sample.
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The average two-day cumulative prediction error (CPE) is the sum of the daily 
average prediction errors:
+1
CPE = £  APEt (4)
t=o
Finally, to test whether a sample’s CPE is significantly different from zero, the test 
statistic divides the CPE by the square root of the product of the estimation-period 
variance and two, which is the number of days in the CPE event-window (0, +1). Also 
note that the resulting test statistic requires the assumption that the estimation-period 
residuals are uncorrelated across securities.
3.3.3. Method of Analysis (Firm Size/ESOP Size)
The degree of asymmetric information released by an announcement, as proxied by 
the magnitude of the prediction error, is hypothesized to be affected by the size of the 
ESOP and size of the firm. As discussed in section 3.2.1, it is argued that ESOP-size 
and the absolute value of the prediction error are directly related, while firm-size and 
prediction error magnitude are inversely related. These effects are tested by regressing 
the absolute value of each firm’s two-day (0, +  l) prediction error onto firm-size and 
ESOP-size explanatory variables.
The sample examined in this analysis is identical to the "asymmetric information" 
sample described in section 3.3.1. The calculation of prediction errors is also identical 
to that of a previous section (3.3.2). The calculation of the ESOP-size variable (ESj) 
is the dollar value of the ESOP (as reported in the press release announcement) divided
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by the market value of the firm’s equity (from CRSP). The firm-size effect (FS,) is 
proxied by partitioning the ESOP sample into large and small firms, based on a 
comparison of their equity’s market value to the median market value of all 
(NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq) CRSP firms. Because the ESOP-size and firm-size 
hypotheses relate to the magnitude of the market’s reaction, the absolute value of each 
firm’s two-day (0, +  l) prediction error is regressed onto the firm-size and ESOP-size 
variables.
To test the hypothesis that ESOP size and the magnitude of the market’s reaction 
are directly related, the regression includes the ESOP-size independent variable defined 
above. It is further argued that the degree of information inferred to the market is 
affected by the size of the firm. In this analysis, the ESOP firms are compared to the 
median size of all CRSP firms and categorized as "large" or "small." An indicator 
variable (FSj) is used to document the specific category with a value of one (zero) 
assigned to firms with market values less than (greater than or equal to) the median 
value.21 The indicator variable is also multiplied by the ESOP-size variable to proxy 
the ESOP-size/firm-size interaction effect. Therefore, the asymmetric information "size 
effect" model is defined as:
\PEj\ = p0 + P !*ESj + p 2*FSj + p ^ (ESj+FSp + ej (5)
21Because theory provides no proper cut-off in size-related studies, a second commonly used cut-off 
method is employed in this analysis. In addition to the "median" method described above, the size 
analysis examines the upper (i.e ., large firms) and lower thirds o f the ESOP sample, as defined by their 
market value. By excluding the middle third from the sample, the firm-size examination focuses on the 
small-firm and large-firm extremes.
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where:
|PEj| =  absolute value of firm j ’s two-day (0, +  l) prediction error.
ESj =  size of firm j ’s ESOP (as a percentage of firm j ’s market value of equity).
FSj =  indicator variable (0 =  large firm; 1 =  small firm), 
ej = error term.
A significant and positive /3X supports the hypothesis that firms announcing the 
establishment or expansion of a large ESOP infer to the market a significant degree of 
(positive or negative, depending on the ESOP structure) information about the true 
value of the firm. In contrast, small ESOPs reveal a low level of private information. 
Furthermore, a significant and positive is supportive of the hypothesis that small-firm 
announcements have a larger impact on firm value because the firms possess, and the 
announcements release, a higher degree of asymmetric information.
To determine the validity of the "magnitude" ("absolute value") contentions 
discussed in section 3.2.1, a regression similar to equation 5 is performed. The only 
difference is the firms’ prediction errors, not absolute value o f the prediction errors, 
are used as the dependent variable. Insignificant coefficients are predicted for this latter 
regression. In formal terms:
PE. = p0 + p,*ES, + p 2*FSj + p 3*(ESj*FSp + e. (6)
where:
PEj =  firm j ’s two-day (0, +  l) prediction error.
ESj =  size of firm j ’s ESOP (as a percentage of firm j ’s market value o f equity).
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FSj = indicator variable (0 =  large firm; 1 =  small firm), 
ej =  error term.
3.4. Results (Revised Asymmetric Information)
Based on an initial examination of ESOP structures comparable to those analyzed 
by Chang and Mayers (1992), the majority of results (documented in Table 5) 
corroborate their findings (discussed in section 3.1.1.). The only difference between 
the two sets of results pertains to the ESOP category of previously unissued common 
stocks. Chang and Mayers note a significant excess return of 0.94 percent, while the 
Table 5 results display an insignificant prediction error of -0.01 percent. The 
difference is probably caused by the fact that a larger percentage of the Table 5 sample 
was taken from a time-period (i.e., post-1987) where the use of ESOPs as an anti­
takeover device was more definitively acknowledged by the market. A less positive 
reaction is therefore predicted (all else equal).
Regardless, the significant 1.01 percent CPE for the total ESOP sample suggests 
that, in general, an ESOP has a positive effect on shareholder wealth. This is 
consistent with the "tax benefit", "motivation", and "shareholder interests" hypotheses 
described in sections 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4, respectively. Furthermore, the significant 
positive CPEs of 1.57 percent and 0.72 percent for ESOPs structured with repurchased 
equity and leverage (respectively) are supportive of the traditional asymmetric 
information hypothesis. The insignificant market reaction to ESOPs structured with 
previously unissued common stock, however, is not consistent with the traditional 
asymmetric information argument. Finally, ESOPs announced in the presence of
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Table 5
Two-day (0, +  l)  average cumulative prediction errors for the total sample, and 
various subsamples, of ESOPs announced during the 1980-1993 period.
N Ave. 
C P E  (%)
Z -sta t1 T -stat R ange o f  C PE  
(%)
Percen t
Positive
Total 319 1.01 5.809*** 4.978*** -34.23 to 33.33 60.1***
T ak eo v er= (T ) 60 -2.74 -6.395*** -5.979*** -34.23 to 9.57 23.3***
N ontakeover= (NT) 259 1.89 9.525*** 8.263*** -9.46 to 33.33 68.7***
R epurch (NT +  T)J 245 1.57 7.677*** 6.741*** -34.23 to 33.33 68.1***
L E  (NT +  T) 120 0.72 3.498*** 2.619*** -22.30 to 12.66 61.7**
CS (NT +  T) 107 -0.01 0.828 -0.076 -22.30 to 33.33 45.8
C PS (NT +  T) 52 -0.18 -0.142 -0.504 -10.00 to 9.41 53.8
*** =  Significant at the 1 percent level. 
** =  Significant at the 5 percent level.
Note: Significance o f the "Percent Positive" column (i.e ., significantly different from 50% ) is 
determined by the W ilcoxon signed-rank test.
1 The z-statistic is based on standardized daily prediction errors.
2 Includes all forms o f  repurchases ( i.e ., open market, tender offer, and targeted repurchases).
LE  =  Leveraged ESOP.
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
C P S =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
NT = ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
T  =  ESOPs announced in the presence o f  takeover activity.
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takeover activity exhibit a significant and negative CPE of -2.74 percent. This suggests 
that the entrenchment effects of the ESOP dominate any securities issuance asymmetric 
information effects that may exist.
In contrast to the Chang and Mayers examination, the sample is stratified by the 
ESOP’s "source/type/use" structure and presence/absence o f takeover activity.22 The 
results of the additional stratification appear to clarify the findings of past ESOP 
research and provide support for the revised asymmetric information hypothesis. In 
particular, the presence of takeover activity and the addition of a simultaneous 
repurchase announcement appear to have overriding negative and positive effect on the 
market’s reaction, respectively.
The overriding negative effect is evident from the significant negative (positive) 
shareholder wealth effects associated with ESOPs announced in the presence (absence) 
of takeover activity (Table 5). This suggests that the market views the additional ESOP 
voting power as a legitimate takeover defense. These results are consistent with Chang 
and Mayers (1992), Gordon and Pound (1990), and Beatty (1995).
In regards to the overriding positive effect of a simultaneous repurchase 
announcement (in the absence of takeover activity), Table 6 shows that ESOPs 
structured with common stock (convertible preferred stock) and a simultaneous non- 
target repurchase announcement have a significant two-day average CPE of 2.09 
percent (1.74 percent). In comparison, common stock (convertible preferred) ESOPs 
structured without a repurchase produce an insignificant -0.01 percent (weakly
“ Because the analysis o f the "presence o f takeover" category involves a small sample size, these 
additional classifications (noted in Table 6) are only examined for the "absence" category.
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Table 6
Two-day (0, +  l) average cumulative prediction errors (CPEs) for the various 
nontakeover subsamples of ESOPs announced during the 1980-1993 period.
N Ave
C P E  ( %)
Z -sta t1 T -stat R ange  o f  C PE  
(%)
P ercen t
Positive
R epurch 185 2.59 11.040*** 9.870*** -9.46 to 33.33 76.7***
T arg e t Rep 25 0.38 0.869 0.410 -8.18 to 11.29 56.0
N on-Rep 74 0.12 0.358 0.267 -8.18 to 19.25 48.6
LE 94 1.69 6.316*** 5.739*** -7.25 to 12.67 73.4***
R epurch 65 2.56 7.586*** 6.811*** -3.80 to 12.67 81.5***
Non-Rep 29 -0.02 0.014 -0.541 -7.25 to 3.23 55.1
CS 85 0.94 3.026*** 2.469** -7.58 to 33.33 56.5
R epurch 39 2.09 3.978*** 3.931*** -6.37 to 33.33 66.7**
N on-Rep 46 -0.01 0.451 -0.070 -7.60 to 13.1 47.8
CS (w /out Rep 
o r  LE)
27 -0.01 0.548 -0.027 -7.60 to 13.1 40.7*
C PS 33 0.94 2.722*** 2.428** -5.59 to 9.40 69.7**
R epurch 25 1.74 4.087*** 4.011*** -1.70 to 9.40 80.0***
Non-Rep 8 -1.54 -1.696* -1.800 -5.59 to 0.71 37.5
C PS (w /out Rep 
o r  LE)
2 -2.74 -0.672 -0.969 -5.59 to 0.13 50.0
LE  & R ep (w /out 
C S & CPS)
27 3.72 6.299*** 5.409*** -2.39 to 12.66 88.9***
**• =  Significance at the 1 percent level. 
** =  Significance at the 5 percent level. 
* =  Significance at the 10 percent level.
Note: Significance o f  the "Percent Positive” column (i.e., significantly different from 50%) is 
determined by the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
1 The z-stat is based on standardized daily prediction errors.
R ep =  R epurch  =  ESOPs structured with a simultaneous repurchase announcement.
LE  =  Leveraged ESOP.
C S =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
C PS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
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significant -1.54 percent) prediction error. In other words, the results of the additional 
stratification suggest that Chang and Mayers’ significant positive (insignificant negative) 
prediction errors attached to ESOP/common stock (convertible preferred) 
announcements are driven by the presence of a simultaneous repurchase announcement.
In terms of the asymmetric information hypothesis, the repurchase announcement 
implies to the market that the managers believe that the stock is underpriced. 
Furthermore, the insignificant market reaction to "common stock" ESOPs structured 
without repurchased equity supports the revised asymmetric information hypothesis. 
In other words, because management does not want to compensate their employees with 
an overpriced security, a non-negative market reaction is expected. The larger negative 
reaction to the "convertible preferred" ESOPs announced without a simultaneous 
repurchase also supports the revised asymmetric information hypothesis. For 
convertibles, the market infers that management did not want to compensate their 
employees with the overpriced common stock. The market, therefore, adjusts the stock 
of the price downward.
Similar findings, and support for the revised hypothesis, are noted for leveraged 
ESOPs in which a significant 2.56 percent (insignificant -0.02 percent) prediction error 
is found when the event is announced with (without) a simultaneous repurchase of 
outstanding common stock. In fact, the overall sample of ESOPs established in the 
absence of takeover activity has a significant positive (insignificant negative) average 
CPE of 2.59 percent (0.12 percent) when the ESOP is structured with (without) a non­
target repurchase. One may therefore infer that the results documented in Table 5,
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which are consistent with those of Chang and Mayers (1992), appear to be highly 
affected by the presence of a simultaneous repurchase announcement. That is, it 
appears that the significance of the positive reactions associated with the announcements 
of non-takeover ESOPs, common stock ESOPs, and leveraged ESOPs is mainly caused 
by the dominating effect of the ESOPs structured with repurchased equity. The same 
can be said for the insignificance of the convertible preferred ESOPs.
Three final stratifications, though relatively small in sample, also support the 
contentions of the asymmetric information hypothesis. Documented in Table 6 is a 
significant positive reaction of 3.72 percent for the 27 leveraged ESOPs constructed 
with repurchased equity and no previously unissued common stock or convertible 
preferred shares. Having the largest average CPE of all documented classifications 
provides additional support to the hypothesis’ separate predictions of a positive market 
reaction to repurchased equity and private loan announcements. Finally, the separate 
analyses of ESOPs structured with common stock and convertible preferred stock (and 
no repurchases nor leverage) produce average CPEs of -0.01 percent and -2.74 percent, 
respectively. Though the small sample sizes of twenty-seven and two weaken the 
implications, the smaller insignificant prediction error of the common stock grouping 
is further support of the revised asymmetric information hypothesis.
3.4.1. Results (Firm Size/ESOP Size)
In addition to determining the firm-size classification (FSj) by comparing each 
firm’s market value to the median of all CRSP market values, a separate classification 
is based on an examination of the lower and upper thirds of the ESOP sample. The
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results of the "median" firm-size cut-off and "extreme thirds" cut-off are documented 
in Tables 7 and 8, respectively. Model (1) of each table regresses the absolute value 
("magnitude") of the two-day (0, +  l) prediction error onto the size variables, while 
regression (2) uses the signed prediction error as the dependent variable.
The size results documented in Table 8 generally support the "magnitude", ESOP- 
size, and firm-size hypotheses outlined in section 3.2.1. With respect to magnitude, 
the insignificance of the F statistic for the signed prediction error model (regression (2), 
p-value =  .154), in contrast to the significant F value for the "magnitude" model 
(regression (1)), supports the argument that because the negative and positive ESOP- 
related market reactions offset each other, the absolute value of the prediction error 
should be used in the size analyses.
For the testing of ESOP-size, the significant positive /S3 coefficient (Table 8, 
regression (2); p-value=.0093) implies that for small firms, the market reaction 
increases with the size of the ESOP. Thus, the positive jS3 is consistent with prior non- 
ESOP size hypotheses (e.g., Ross, 1977, and Miller and Rock, 1985). In contrast, the 
insignificant j3, suggests that the market reaction for larger firms is unaffected by the 
size of the ESOP. Furthermore, the significant positive /J2 coefficient (p-value = 
.0037) is consistent with the position that small firms possess a larger degree of 
asymmetric information than large firms, as argued and reported in previous non-ESOP 
research (e.g., Atiase, 1985, Dann, 1981, and Vermaelen, 1981).
In contrast to the ESj*FSj results documented in Table 8, and based on the median 
cut-off examination, where mid-size firms are included in the examination, the results
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Table 7
OLS regression results relating the firm-size (based on a comparison o f market 
values with the CRSP median) and ESOP-size effects to the absolute value of the 
two-day announcement prediction errors.
MODEL:
1) | PEj | =  /30 +  /3,*ESj +  /32*FSj +  /?3*(ESj*FSj) +  ^
2) PE, =  jSp +  jg.^ESj +  ft-FS j +  ff3*(ESj*FSj) +  e,
(i) (1) (2) (2)
V ariables Param eter
Estim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
Intercept .0256 .0001 .0067 .2107
ESj .0244 .4971 -.0484 .2836
FSj .0236 .0026 .0177 .0706
ESj*FSj -.0095 .8551 .0416 .5225
(1) =  | PE | Model: (F Value =  5.21, P-Value =  .002; R2 =  .056)
(2) =  PE Model: (F Value =  2.91, P-Value =  .035; R2 =  .032)
Table 8
OLS regression results relating the firm-size (based on the upper and lower thirds 
of the ESOP sample) and ESOP-size effects to the absolute value of the two-day 
announcement prediction errors.
MODEL:
1) | PEj | =  ft, +  0 ,*ESj +  02*FSj +  /?3*(ESj*FSj) +  e,
2) PEj =  &  +  g^ESj +  j8a*FSj +  j^ E S fF S j)  +  ej
(1) (1) (2) (2)
V ariables Param eter
Estim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
Intercept .0244 .0001 .0117 .0456
ESj -.0399 .2495 -.0789 .0710
FSj .0101 .0037 .0006 .8883
ESj*FSj .1076 .0093 .1155 .0265
(1) =  | PE | Model: (F Value =  4.96, P-Value =  .002; R2 =  .054)
(2) =  PE Model: (F Value =  1.77, P-Value =  .154; R2 =  .019)
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of Table 7 do not support the firm-size/ESOP-size interaction hypotheses. In particular, 
the /?3 coefficient of regression (1) exhibits an insignificant p-value of .8551. The 
regression (1) results of Tables 7 and 8 therefore suggest that classifying mid-size firms 
into small- and large-firm categories dilutes the ESOP-size effects argued for in this 
analysis.
3.5. Conclusion
Prior research has led us to believe that ESOPs structured with previously unissued 
common stock have a significant positive effect on shareholder wealth, while those 
structured with convertible preferred equity have an insignificant effect. Based on 
additional stratifications of the ESOP structure, the results noted in this essay suggest 
that the findings are strongly affected by two factors, the presence o f takeover activity 
and the simultaneous announcement of repurchased equity.
Consistent with previous literature, the results show that ESOPs announced in the 
presence of takeover activity exhibit a significant and negative market reaction. This 
finding is supportive of the managerial entrenchment effect (section 2.4). In contrast, 
ESOP structures announced in the absence of takeover activity tend to have a non­
negative effect on shareholder wealth. More specifically, for ESOPs structured with 
previously unissued common stock, the dominating effect of a simultaneous repurchase 
announcement is evidenced by a significant positive cumulative prediction error for 
ESOPs structured with repurchased equity and an insignificant CPE for those without 
repurchased equity. Similar evidence is noted for ESOPs structured with convertible 
preferred equity. That is, "convertible preferred" ESOPs structured without (with) a
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simultaneous repurchase announcement have a weakly significant negative (positive) 
effect on shareholder wealth.
Though the positive outcomes associated with ESOPs structured with repurchased 
equity are supportive of the traditional asymmetric information hypothesis, the finding 
that common stock ESOPs announced without repurchased equity have a less negative 
effect on shareholder wealth than convertible preferred ESOP announcements is exactly 
opposite to prior non-ESOP securities issuance results. This finding is, however, 
supportive of a revised asymmetric information hypothesis that contends that managers 
are concerned with the welfare o f their employees when structuring the ESOP.23
In other words, the results are consistent with the contention that because 
management does not want to issue an overvalued equity to the employees, ESOPs 
structured with common stock will have a non-negative effect on shareholder wealth. 
Furthermore, because ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity imply that 
management did not want to issue (overpriced) common stock to the employees, a 
negative reaction is expected. Asymmetric information, a popular theory used to 
explain the market’s reaction to securities issuances, is (in this revised form) therefore 
applicable to, and supported by, the securities issuance structure of an employee stock 
ownership plan. Finally, the argument that small firms, and large ESOPs, possess a 
higher level of asymmetric information is also supported by the results of this essay.
23T h is  co n ce rn  is  c o n sisten t w ith  th e  assu m p tio n  th a t E S O P s a re  c rea ted  to m o tiv a te  the  em p loyees.
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Chapter 4 
Essay Two: Insider Ownership
4.1. Introduction
Given the assumption that the ESOP-controlled equity will vote with management 
if a hostile takeover is attempted, the purpose of this essay is to examine an ESOP’s 
effect on shareholder wealth in relation to the assumed increase in managerial voting 
power. Because ESOPs do not directly affect the cash-flow level of insider 
(managerial) ownership, yet are assumed to increase the voting power o f management, 
ESOPs allow for more direct tests of the corporate control/insider ownership 
hypotheses.24 "More direct" is documented because the Leland and Pyle (1977) 
signalling hypothesis and Jensen and Meckling (1976) alignment o f interests hypothesis 
do not apply to events such as ESOPs that change the firm’s voting structure without 
affecting the manager’s cash-flow ownership, the variable of concern in both studies.
Specifically, Leland and Pyle suggest that the level o f a manager’s cash-flow 
ownership and the value of the firm are positively related. The authors argue that in 
order to preserve their personal wealth, managers do not want a high degree of 
ownership if their firm is overvalued. Conversely, a high level o f personal ownership 
suggests that the managers are optimistic about the firm’s future cash flows. Similarly,
24The market for corporate control is hypothesized to (informally) exist for corporations/managers 
interested in the right to manage corporate assets. Often times, this involves taking over firms that are 
inefficiently run by another set o f managers (Manne, 1965, and Jensen and Ruback, 1983). One strategy 
used to prevent such a buyout, and therefore allow the inefficient managers to maintain corporate control, 
is to increase the managerial ownership (voting power) to a level sufficient to veto all takeovers. 
Consistent with this scenario, this essay analyzes the connection between an ESOP’s effect on managerial 
voting power and the change in shareholder wealth.
63
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Jensen and Meckling contend that a high level of cash-flow insider ownership enhances 
the value o f the firm because it aligns the interests of the managers with those of the 
shareholders. The "alignment of interests" increases firm value because it reduces the 
managers’ incentives to "shirk" their duties and consume excessive perquisites. The 
point to be made, however, is that cash-flow ownership, not voting power, is the 
variable of concern in Leland and Pyle and Jensen and Meckling. Thus, their theories 
can not be applied to the analysis of ESOPs because the managers’ cash-flow ownership 
is unchanged by an increase in ESOP ownership.25 The ESOP, however, does 
increase the voting power controlled by management. How this change in voting power 
affects the value of the firm is the question addressed in this essay.
More specifically, the theoretical ownership-related effects pertinent to a change in 
voting power, and therefore ESOPs, are related to the "shareholder interests" and 
"managerial entrenchment" hypotheses. The shareholder interests hypothesis argues for 
an increase in firm value with the establishment of an ESOP because the additional 
voting power will be used by management to increase the premium of an attempted 
takeover. Absent a block of insider ownership, it is assumed that the diverse 
shareholder ownership is initially unable to form a cartel to procure an adequate 
takeover premium. The shareholder interests hypothesis suggests that an increase in 
managerial voting power allows management to act as a substitute for the cartel and
23The exception to this statement is if the ESOP is structured without repurchased equity. The new 
shares would then dilute the managers’ cash-flow ownership percentage. In contrast, the use o f a 
repurchase would in whole or part preserve the managers’ ownership percentage, depending on the size 
o f  the repurchase relative to the ESOP. Thus, consistent with essay one, this repurchase effect on 
managerial ownership is a further positive signal to the market.
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negotiate a higher takeover bid for the shareholders. The resulting effect is a rise in 
firm value when managerial voting power is increased.
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis contends that the value o f the firm is 
harmed by an ESOP because the increase in voting power will be used by management 
to prevent subsequent hostile takeover attempts, regardless of the offered premium and 
welfare of the shareholders. In particular, managers who reach a level of voting power 
sufficient to prevent all takeover threats are able to increase their perquisite 
consumption without retribution. For obvious reasons, the entrenchment effect is 
particularly harmful to firms with an inefficient set o f managers. Nevertheless, the 
hypothesized outcome from the increase in managerial voting power is a decrease in 
firm value.
The shareholder interests and managerial entrenchment hypotheses are closely 
related to Stulz’s (1988) valuation model,26 which incorporates the probability of a 
successful takeover and magnitude of the takeover premium offered to the firm. Stulz 
argues that firm value is enhanced by an increase in takeover premium, an effect that 
increases with the rise in managerial voting power. In contrast, an increase in
“ The outcomes predicted by the shareholder interests and managerial entrenchment hypotheses are 
also consistent with the contentions o f Harris and Raviv (1988). In their model, the level o f  managerial 
ownership is related to three "value affecting" outcomes associated with the market for corporate control. 
W ithin the group o f firms that are takeover targets, the subset o f firms with a low level o f insider 
ownership (10) is likely to be successfully taken over. For firms with medium levels o f 10, a proxy fight 
is probable and the success o f the takeover is indeterminable. Finally, for firms with high IO, 
management is firmly entrenched and, therefore, able to fight off the takeover. Harris and Raviv further 
contend that the level o f  insider ownership is determined by management via the decision-making process 
o f maximizing the sum o f their perquisites and equity value. Nevertheless, the model predicts a(n) 
decrease (increase) in firm value when high (low) 10 firms increase their level o f  insider ownership. 
Because the Stulz and Harris and Raviv predictions are similar, the remainder o f this essay will focus 
on Stulz’s (1988) model.
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managerial voting power reduces the probability of a successful takeover, thus 
decreasing the value of the firm. Due to the divergent effects, firm value is maximized 
at a level of insider ownership where the benefit of the increase in premium equals the 
cost of the decrease in the probability of a takeover. Detailed discussions of Stulz’s 
model are provided in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2.
The second essay analyzes the ESOP’s interaction with these ownership and 
takeover-valuation effects. Unlike prior insider ownership/takeover-valuation 
examinations, it is argued that because some firms are highly unlikely to ever become 
a takeover candidate (due to factors such as the firm’s financial structure and size), an 
inclusion of these firms in the analysis serves only to dilute the overall results. The 
following examination, therefore, tests for the ownership effects of an ESOP on two 
separate groupings, firms "attractive"27 for takeover and firms in which a takeover bid 
is highly unlikely (i.e., "unattractive" firms).
The framework of the second essay is founded on two propositions: 1) the effects 
attributed to the "shareholder interests" and "entrenchment" hypotheses are noteworthy 
only for firms with a sufficient level of takeover attractiveness; and 2) the takeover- 
related effects will differ for attractive firms that fall into one of three "pre- versus 
post-" announcement levels of managerial voting power.28 To be specific, it is argued 
that "attractive" firms with a low level of voting power prior to the ESOP will have a 
negative (positive) market reaction if  the post-level of voting power is determined by
2 T h e  attractive category consists o f  ESOP firms that exhibit financial characteristics similar to those 
o f non-ESOP firms that received a hostile bid in the 1987-1993 period (sections 4.1.3 and 4.3.1).
^Managerial voting power is defined as the sum o f the insider and ESOP ownerships.
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the market to be "high" ("low").29 In terms of Stulz, the negative (positive) reaction 
is predicted because the cost of the decrease in takeover probability exceeds (is less 
than) the benefit of the increase in takeover premium associated with the rise in aligned 
ownership. Finally, firms with a high pre-announcement level of insider voting power 
will experience reactions that differ from those of firms with a low pre-announcement 
level o f voting power. In fact, it will be argued that these firms with a high pre­
announcement level should be categorized as "unattractive for takeover" because the 
probability of receiving a hostile takeover offer is constantly low (due to entrenchment), 
regardless of the change in managerial voting power.
4.1.1. Stulz (1988)
Stulz’s (1988) theoretical model demonstrates that the percentage o f votes controlled 
by management has a significant effect on firm value because it directly affects the 
likelihood of a takeover attempt and magnitude of the associated takeover premium. 
As the control percentage is increased, the benefit (i.e., increase in firm value) of an 
enlarged takeover premium and the cost of a decrease in takeover probability affect the 
value of the firm. The model further contends that firm value initially rises as the 
control percentage increases because the "takeover premium" benefit exceeds the 
"probability" cost. As the control percentage continues to rise, the cost will eventually 
exceed the benefit, and firm value will drop.
“ "High" is defined as the level o f insider votes sufficient to prevent a hostile takeover (based on the 
state o f  incorporation and corporate bylaw supermajority provisions) and "post" refers to the time-period 
subsequent to the ESOP announcement.
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Because ESOPs are assumed to increase the percentage of votes controlled by 
management, Stulz’s model suggests that the establishment of an ESOP will alter the 
value of the firm. In other words, the probability of a firm being successfully taken 
over and the magnitude of the takeover premium are affected by the announced ESOP. 
For example, Stulz’s model predicts that a firm with a low percentage of insider 
ownership will have a positive market reaction to the announcement of an ESOP funded 
with voting equity. This overall effect is believed to occur because the benefit o f an 
increased takeover premium will exceed the cost of the reduced probability of a 
successful takeover. The model also predicts that a firm with a high percentage of 
insider ownership will experience a negative wealth effect when an announced ESOP 
is funded with shares of voting equity. The negative reaction is predicted because the 
cost of a reduced probability of takeover exceeds the gain from an increase in the 
required takeover premium.
In addition to the ESOP-related research discussed in the following section (4.1.2.), 
several empirical studies examine the insider ownership/firm value relationship. For 
example, Wruck (1989) examines the relation between the level of insider ownership 
and the market’s reaction to a private equity announcement. In addition, Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988a) 
(MSV) analyze the relation between corporate performance and insider ownership. 
Wruck and MSV find positive (negative) effects for firms with insider ownership 
percentages below 5 percent (between 5 and 25 percent). Though the insider ownership 
percentages are lower than hypothesized, these results are consistent with the arguments
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of Stulz. McConnell and Servaes’ results suggest that a firm’s value is maximized with 
a far greater percentage of insider ownership (approximately 37 percent for their 
analysis of 1986 firms), and Demsetz and Lehn note that insider ownership has no 
relationship with the firm’s accounting rate of return. In sum, no definitive relation 
between firm value and the level of insider ownership is provided by their results.
Moreover, a "chicken and the egg" problem arises in their studies. The authors 
imply that it is the level of insider ownership that affects the value of the firm. Given 
their analysis of firm value and insider ownership focuses on a single point in time, it 
is equally acceptable to say that it is the value of the firm that is affecting the level of 
insider ownership. In other words, it is possible that the managers determine their level 
of ownership based on the value of the firm, as suggested by Leland and Pyle (1977).
4.1.2. Revising the Interpretations of Stulz
Chang and Mayers (1992) and Dhillon and Ramirez (1994) are among those that 
have performed empirical tests in which the level of insider ownership (10) prior to an 
ownership-increasing event (e.g., an ESOP announcement) is the key explanatory 
variable. Thus, it appears that many interpret Stulz’s model as a prediction that for 
firms with a low (high) level of pre-announcement insider ownership, the magnitude 
of the insider ownership increase and the size of the positive (negative) market reaction 
are directly related. They further imply that this expectation will hold irrespective of 
the level of post-announcement insider ownership. Essay two contends that the levels 
of pre- and post-insider ownership are the critical explanatory variables related to the 
ownership/corporate control effects. For example, if an event transforms a "low 10"
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firm into a "high 10" firm, a negative market reaction is predicted because the cost of 
the reduced probability of a takeover will now exceed the benefit o f a rise in the 
takeover premium. This is counter to most studies that predict a positive reaction 
because of the initially low level of insider ownership.
A second contrast to the typical Stulz interpretations is the contention that firms 
with a high level of insider ownership throughout the event analysis (i.e., pre- and 
post-) will be unaffected by the insider ownership/corporate control effects related to 
a change in voting power. This argument is based on the notion that the market has 
already accounted for the entrenchment effect that existed prior to the voting power 
increase. In other words, a "high-IO" firm that announces an ownership-increasing 
event will be insignificantly affected by the entrenchment effect because the firm is 
effectively "unattractive" for takeover. A typical Stulz interpretation would predict a 
negative market reaction when insider ownership is increased by firms with an initially 
high level of voting power.
In contrast to the format of this essay’s insider ownership examination, the structure 
of the ESOP ownership analyses performed by Chang and Mayers and Dhillon and 
Ramirez does not directly account for the post-announcement ownership levels. 
Regardless, Chang and Mayers claim to support Stulz’s model with their regression of 
ESOP announcement prediction errors onto a set of interaction variables composed of 
the magnitude of the ESOP and an indicator variable with a value (of zero or one) 
based on the level of insider ownership prior to the ESOP. The "magnitude" is defined
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as the size of the ESOP,30 and the indicator variable corresponds to one of five pre-IO 
levels (below 10%, 10%-20%, 20%-30%, 30%-40%, and above 40%). Weakly 
consistent with Stulz is their finding that all coefficients attached to the four interaction 
variables with IOs below 40 percent were positive, while the "above 40 percent" 
coefficient was negative.
The support is "weakly consistent" because, of the five separate regressions 
performed on their data, only the "10%-20%" coefficient was significantly positive. 
Furthermore, only one of the five regressions had a significant negative (at the 10 
percent level) "above 40%" coefficient. For clarity, one interpretation o f their results 
is that for firms with a pre-IO between 10 and 20 percent, as the size of the ESOP 
increases, the magnitude of the positive market reaction (on the day of the ESOP 
announcement) also rises. Moreover, for firms with managerial ownership in excess 
of 40 percent, the size of the ESOP and the magnitude of the decrease in shareholder 
wealth move in the same direction. It should be remembered, however, that the 10 
percent incremental cut-offs (for the indicator variables) are purely subjective and the 
results are relatively weak. Essay two improves on this process by employing a more 
objective cut-off measure, accounting for the pre- and post-announcement levels of 
managerial power, and differentiating between ESOP firms that are attractive and 
unattractive for takeover.
Irrespective of the Chang and Mayers results, this essay asserts that the firm’s post­
announcement ownership level (i.e., pre-IO plus ESOP ownership) must also be
•“ Calculated as a percentage o f shares outstanding.
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specifically accounted for in the ESOP/Insider Ownership research. To point out the 
importance of this accountability, consider the results predicted by Chang and Mayers’ 
regression for a firm with a pre-IO level of 10 percent and a 3 percent ESOP, and a 
firm with a pre-IO level of 17 percent and a 10 percent ESOP. Given the larger ESOP 
size and a pre-IO between 10 and 20 percent, the "17%" firm is predicted to have a 
significantly larger positive effect on shareholder wealth, regardless of the post­
announcement level of insider ownership. In contrast to the regression’s predictions, 
given that very few tender offer takeovers transpire when the level of insider ownership 
exceeds 20 percent (per Bradley and Kim, 1985), essay two predicts a negative market 
reaction for the " 17% pre-IO" firm when an ESOP is announced. Despite the low level 
of pre-announcement insider ownership, this result is expected because the takeover 
probability is greatly reduced.
A similar analysis is performed by Dhillon and Ramirez (1994) who regress the 
firms’ prediction errors onto two "pre-IO"/"ESOP magnitude" interaction variables. 
Their pre-IO indicator variables (with values of 0 or 1) account for the insider 
ownership levels above and below 15 percent. The results demonstrate that the "below" 
("above") coefficient was insignificantly positive (significantly negative). Thus, for 
firms with a pre-announcement IO level in excess of 15 percent, the size of the ESOP 
and the effect on firm value are inversely related. In addition to the "pre- versus post-" 
IO problems (as described above), the Dhillon and Ramirez (DR) and Chang and 
Mayers (CM) results appear to conflict. That is, the CM (DR) regression produces a(n) 
significant (insignificant) positive coefficient for low levels of pre-IO, and an
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insignificant (significant) negative coefficient for high levels of pre-announcement IO. 
Taken as a whole, the conflicting results and unfocused method of past ESOP/IO 
research demonstrate the importance of an examination that accounts for the interactions 
between the pre- and post-levels of voting power and the corporate control effects of 
attractive/unattractive firms.
4.1.3. Takeover Attractiveness
Stulz also suggests that the "attractiveness" of a firm as a takeover target affects the 
premium and probability of takeover and, therefore, the predicted value o f the firm. 
This essay asserts that the probability of takeover attached to a highly unattractive firm 
is unaffected by an increase in insider or ESOP ownership because its pre- and post­
announcement values are constantly close to zero. The zero probability is based on the 
argument that no bidder considers them a valid target. On the other hand, an attractive 
firm will have a takeover premium and probability that are highly dependent on the 
levels of insider and ESOP ownership. Given these differences, it is argued that past 
insider ownership studies have produced diluted results because the attractive and 
unattractive firms are pooled together. Furthermore, the resulting averages camouflage 
the hypothesized significant ownership effects attached to the attractive firms.
The arguments noted above, however, assume that the market is able to 
differentiate between firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. Prior 
empirical research suggests that there are differences between firms targeted for 
takeover and firms absent of takeover activity. Wansley, Roenfeldt, and Cooley (1983) 
perform a discriminant analysis on merged and randomly selected non-merged firms.
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The findings outline a financial profile in which the "merged firms generally have 
smaller price-eamings ratios, use less debt, are smaller, grow more rapidly, and have 
less market value of equity in relation to book value of assets" than the non-merged 
firms.
Similarly, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988b) compare firms subject to hostile 
takeovers, corporations involved in friendly mergers, and nontarget firms. The findings 
suggest that, relative to the nontarget firms, the "takeover" firms are significantly 
smaller in size. In addition, the firms that experience a hostile takeover typically have 
a lower percentage, and dollar value, of equity owned by top management. Based on 
the assumption that markets are relatively efficient, one can further assume that 
investors are aware of, and account for, the differences between firms that are attractive 
and unattractive for takeover.
4.1.4. Determination of the "High"/"Low" Levels of Voting Power
Because this essay is concerned with the voting power of management, the level of 
insider ownership must be adjusted for the differences in the percentage of votes 
necessary to prevent a takeover. These differences are attributed to a firm’s, and its 
state of incorporation’s, supermajority provisions. In other words, due to the varying 
state laws and corporate bylaws addressing the ownership approval of hostile takeovers, 
determination of a "high" and "low" level of insider ownership is somewhat ambiguous. 
For example, state law requires that a minimum of 15 percent of a firm’s nonaligned 
(i.e., non-insider) shares vote against a hostile takeover in order to effectively deter the 
takeover of firms incorporated in Delaware. In comparison, California-based firms
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need a minimum of 50 percent of the aggregate votes to prevent a takeover. 
Furthermore, several corporations have supermajority provisions requiring that 67 to 
90 percent of the outstanding votes be cast in favor of the takeover. Without such 
approval, the takeover is defeated.
Despite the supermajority differences across states and corporate bylaws, past 
insider ownership/corporate control research has treated these voting provisions as if 
they were identical for all firms. For example, prior research would consider two firms 
with 15 percent insider ownership as having identical corporate control/insider 
ownership effects regardless of the presence of differing state of incorporation or 
corporate bylaw supermajority provisions.
In support of these contentions, previous literature suggests that the market accounts 
for the effects related to an announced change in the firm’s, and its state of 
incorporation’s, supermajority provisions. Karpoff and Malatesta (1989) examine the 
announcement-day price effects of firms incorporated in states announcing a 
supermajority (control share acquisition) law. As a demonstration o f the implied 
importance of this supermajority adjustment, 15 states have adopted a control share 
acquisition law between 1982 and 1987. For the firms incorporated in a 
"supermajority" state, the authors find a significant negative announcement-day effect 
on shareholder wealth. This supports the contention that the voting power of 
management is effectively increased to a level approaching entrenchment. More 
important, it suggests that the state of incorporation’s supermajority provisions should 
be accounted for when examining the effect of voting power on the value of the firm.
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Similarly, previous empirical studies support the contention that insider ownership 
research should account for the firm-specific supermajority provisions. In particular, 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) examine the stock price reaction to the announcement of 
several firm-specific anti-takeover provisions, including the supermajority amendment. 
Once again, the significant negative market reaction to the announcement suggests that 
the voting power of management is effectively increased to a level approaching 
entrenchment. It also supports the argument that corporate control and insider 
ownership analyses should adjust for the presence o f a firm’s supermajority provision. 
The specifics regarding how a firm’s insider ownership is adjusted for these 
supermajority provisions are discussed in section 4.3.2.
4.2. ESOP/Insider Ownership Hypotheses
Similar to previous literature, the general purpose of essay two is to examine the 
effect of ESOPs on a firm’s managerial voting power and, in turn, on the value of the 
firm. Unlike prior analyses, however, this study uses a measure of managerial voting 
power that accounts for the state of incorporation and firm-specific supermajority 
provisions. The importance of this measure is implied by the significant and negative 
shareholder wealth effects associated with firms incorporated in a state that announced 
a supermajority provision (Karpoff and Malatesta, 1989) and firms that announced a 
firm-specific supermajority amendment (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1987). The negative 
results presumably reflect the market’s belief that the managers’ voting power is 
enhanced to a level that approaches entrenchment.
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A second material difference between this and previous studies is the classification 
of the ESOP sample into firms that are "attractive" and "unattractive" for takeover. 
Because prior analyses (e.g., Wansley, Roenfeldt, and Cooley, 1983, and Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1988b) suggest that there are characteristic differences between 
target and nontarget firms, and given the fact that the shareholder interests, managerial 
entrenchment, and Stulz-related hypotheses are takeover-related, a stratification by 
takeover attractiveness appears warranted. Without a separate analysis of attractive and 
unattractive firms, it is hypothesized that the insignificant unattractive effects dilute the 
significant insider ownership effects associated with ESOP firms that are attractive for 
takeover.
A final difference between the essay two analyses and prior ESOP research is the 
inclusion of pre- and post-announcement managerial voting power variables. By 
accounting for the degree of managerial voting power subsequent to the ESOP 
announcement, a correct interpretation of Stulz’s (1988) valuation model is possible. 
Previous empirical research (e.g., Chang and Mayers, 1992, and Dhillon and Ramirez, 
1994) implicitly focuses on the firm’s probability of takeover and associated takeover 
premium that exists prior to the ESOP announcement. Conversely, this essay accounts 
for the differences in the level o f the managerial voting power between the pre- and 
post-announcement periods. To be specific, the analyses classify the pre- and post­
levels of voting power as "low" or "high", depending on the percentage of votes 
necessary to veto a takeover and the percentage of votes controlled by management. 
For example, firms with a percentage of insider-controlled votes in excess of the
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percentage required to veto a takeover are classified as having a high level of 
managerial voting power.
By combining the three analytical improvements noted above, the following 
hypotheses are tested in essay two:
8) The market will react negatively to the announcement of an ESOP that increases a 
firm ’s managerial voting power from "low" to "high."
9) A positive market reaction is predicted for ESOPs announced by firms with a "low" 
pre- and post-announcement level of managerial voting power.
10) The effects predicted in 8) and 9) are only significant for firms that are attractive 
for takeover.
The negative reaction predicted in (8) is consistent with the managerial 
entrenchment hypothesis and a Stulz interpretation that contends that the cost of the 
decrease in the probability of takeover exceeds the benefit of an increase in the 
magnitude of the takeover premium. The positive effect predicted in (9) supports the 
shareholder interests hypothesis and the argument that the cost of a decrease in takeover 
probability is less than the benefit of an increase in takeover premium. Finally, 
hypothesis (10) states that the effects predicted in (8) and (9) are only significant for 
ESOP firms that are attractive for takeover. Because the shareholder interests, 
managerial entrenchment, and Stulz-related hypotheses are predominantly based on the 
effects of takeover activity, it is argued that the unattractive firms are not affected by 
a change in managerial voting power.
4.2.1. Blockholder/Institutional Ownership Hypotheses
The efficient-monitoring hypothesis predicts that firm value and institutional 
ownership are positively related as a result of the high-quality, low-cost monitoring of
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the firm provided by institutional owners (Pound, 1988). McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) support this contention with their regression results that note a significant 
relationship between the percentage of institutional ownership and Tobin’s q, a firm- 
value proxy. The increase in managerial voting power (from the ESOP creation), and 
its effect on the institutional owners’ monitoring effectiveness, are also examined in this 
essay. To be specific, it is hypothesized that the increase in managerial voting power 
negates the effectiveness of the outsiders’ (i.e., blockholders’ and institutional owners’) 
monitoring. It is further argued that the magnitude of the negative outcome (from the 
decrease in monitoring effectiveness) is a function of the level of outside ownership and 
the ESOP’s contribution to the voting power of management.
Brickley, Lease, and Smith’s (1994) analysis of the voting process of management- 
sponsored anti-takeover amendments examines several hypotheses, two of particular 
relevance to this study. First, the blockholder-participation hypothesis asserts that 
"blockholders [and institutional owners] are more active in the voting process than non- 
blockholders." Second, the blockholder opposition hypothesis states that "blockholders 
(including financial institutions) are more likely than non-blockholders to oppose 
managers on value-reducing proposals." Evidence from their analysis is consistent with 
both hypotheses. One interpretation of these findings is that institutional owners and 
blockholders perform a value-enhancing monitoring service to the shareholders of the 
corporation. In other words, because management is aware of the institutional owners’ 
and blockholders’ active participation, a reduction in agency costs ensues.
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In relation to managerial voting power, however, if  management has reached a level 
of entrenchment, the monitoring effect is eliminated because the institutional investors 
and blockholders have no power, regardless of their participation and opposition. With 
this in mind, the purpose of the following analysis is to determine whether the market 
accounts for the hypothesized loss in value caused by an increase in managerial voting 
power (from the ESOP) and associated decrease in effective monitoring.
With respect to ESOPs, Chang and Mayers (1992) alternatively argue that 
institutional blockholdings act as a complement to, or substitute for, the votes controlled 
by management. Their explanations are limited and vague, however, and their testing 
is unfocused. Of the twenty-plus coefficients produced in the Chang and Mayers 
regressions, seven represent the effects attributed to various ownership categories. That 
is, the ownership percentages of institutions, institutional blockholders (where 
blockholder is defined as an investor with an ownership level in excess of 5 percent), 
employee benefit plan blockholders, officer blockholders, outside director blockholders, 
outside blockholders, and the CEO are used as separate explanatory variables.
Several points should be noted. First, the sum of the CEO, officer blockholder, 
and outside director ownership percentages should have a high correlation with Chang 
and Mayers’ insider ownership (IO) interaction variables (described in section 4.1.2), 
thus allowing for a collinearity problem in the regression. Second, the two ownership 
coefficients that are significant among the seven analyzed by Chang and Mayers appear 
to be in conflict. That is, the significant positive and negative coefficients of the
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"institutional holding" and "institutional blockholding" percentages (respectively) 
provide an element of confusion with their opposite signs.31
Finally, the overall format of Chang and Mayers’ institutional and blockholder 
ownership variables does not appear to accurately test the ownerships’ relationship with 
the market’s reaction to an ESOP announcement. For example, why is an inverse 
relation (or any relation) expected between the prediction error and the ownership level 
of the institutional blockholder when an ESOP is announced? In contrast, this essay 
suggests that firms with high levels o f institutional/blockholder ownership experience 
a negative announcement effect i f  the insider’s voting power has reached a level of 
entrenchment that negates the positive monitoring effects of the blockholder. Such a 
hypothesis is not empirically tested by Chang and Mayers. Their results merely suggest 
that regardless of the level of managerial voting power, the prediction errors and 
blockholder percentages are negatively related.
In sum, this essay contends that ESOP firms with a low pre- and post- (low pre- 
and high post-) level of managerial voting power will experience a non-negative 
(negative) effect because the benefit o f the increased takeover premium exceeds (is less 
than) the cost of a reduced takeover probability and monitoring effect. Though the 
direction o f these effects is predicted irrespective of the level o f institutional ownership, 
it is further hypothesized that the negative effect will rise with the size of the 
blockholder/institutional ownership percentage because of an increasing reduction in
31 With little explanation, the authors suggest that "complementarity" and "substitute for managerial 
vote control" effects are the cause. W hy two similar proxies for the effects o f  institutional ownership 
produce differing results is puzzling, however.
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monitoring value when management becomes entrenched. In other words, an 
examination of the monitoring effects (in relation to an ESOP announcement) must also 
incorporate the pre- and post-levels of managerial voting power.
To perform the examination, the ESOP sample is first split into firms with high and 
low levels of institutional/blockholder (outside) ownership. The classification of "high" 
and "low" levels of outside ownership is determined by comparing the outside 
ownership percentage of a firm to the median of the sample.32 A significantly larger 
negative effect is predicted for firms with a high level of outside ownership that 
announce ESOPs that change the level of insider ownership from "low" to "high."
In other words, prior to the ESOP announcement, a firm with a high level of 
outside ownership is hypothesized to have a larger takeover premium than a firm with 
a low level of outside ownership, all else equal. The larger premium is a result of the 
assumption that the institutions are more informed and, therefore, less likely to accept 
a takeover bid unless an adequate premium is offered. Furthermore, the benefit of this 
increased premium (and increase in monitoring) is effectively negated when the firm 
has an entrenched level of insider ownership. Therefore, a significant negative effect 
is predicted when an ESOP changes a firm with a high level of outside ownership into 
a "low-to-high IO" entity. The blockholder/institutional ownership hypothesis is 
formally listed as follows:
11) Firms with a "high" level of outside ownership will experience a significantly 
larger negative effect (relative to "low" firms) when an announced ESOP increases the 
managers’ voting power from "low" to "high."
32Because CD-Disclosure (the source of this data) is unavailable prior to 1987, the following analysis 
is performed on ESOPs established or expanded after January 1, 1987.
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4.3. Data and Method of Analysis
4.3.1. Attractive versus Unattractive Firms
The method of analysis employed to support the contentions of Stulz is a regression 
of the firms’ cumulative prediction errors onto varying ownership variables. Because 
the regression is to be performed separately on ESOPs classified as attractive and 
unattractive for takeover, the first step of this examination is to categorize the ESOPs 
by takeover attractiveness. In order to perform such a task, a financial profile of non- 
ESOP firms targeted for takeover in the 1987-1993 period is constructed in a manner 
similar to that performed by Wansley, Roenfeldt, and Cooley (1983) (WRC). In their 
examination, a discriminant analysis of merged and randomly selected firms (i.e., the 
control group) is used to determine a financial profile of each group.
In a similar manner, this essay uses a set of eleven financial calculations to separate 
the ESOP firms into attractive and unattractive groupings. One difference between 
WRC’s and essay two’s analysis is the fact that the latter only examines firms subject 
to a hostile takeover. This is due to the corporate control, entrenchment, and 
ESOP/Insider Ownership valuation effects being particularly associated with firms 
experiencing a hostile takeover.
The initial sample of 154 hostile takeover firms33 is identified from a search of the 
1987-1993 Nexis Newswire press releases. Comparable to WRC’s examination, an 
equal number of control group (non-merged) firms is randomly selected from a listing
“ Identical to Morck, Shleifer, Vishny (1988b) (MSV), a hostile takeover is defined as one in which 
"the initial bid for the target was neither negotiated with its board prior to being made nor accepted by 
the board as m ade." Unlike MSV, however, essay two examines all hostile takeovers, regardless o f the 
bidder’s success or failure.
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of CRSP firms. Unlike WRC’s procedures, control group firms that had a takeover- 
related press release announced during the 1987-1993 period are eliminated from the 
sample to increase the likelihood that the control firms are not "attractive for takeover."
To determine the characteristics that differentiate the two groups, a discriminant
analysis is performed on the 11 variables calculated for the combined sample of 
takeover and control group firms.34 The following is a list of the variables used in the 
discriminant analysis. Variables one through five (six through nine) are comparable to 
the significant variables use in W RC’s (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny’s) examination. 
Finally, the hypothesized relationship between each variable of interest and the level of 
attractiveness is documented in parentheses.35
1) The natural logarithm of net sales (inverse).
2) The book value of long-term debt divided by equity (inverse).
3) The price-earnings ratio (inverse).
4) The market value of equity divided by total assets (inverse).
5) The compound growth in net sales; equal to the geometric average growth rate for 
the three years prior to the takeover attempt (direct).
6) The percentage of common stock owned by the top two officers (inverse).
7) The percentage of common stock owned by all insiders (inverse).
34The firm’s year-end data for the period prior to the takeover (or control firm  selection) date are 
used to calculate the necessary financial variables. CD Disclosure is the source o f  the financial data and 
ownership information. Of the 154 takeover firms initially located, 52 were eliminated due to insufficient 
information (Final sample: 102 takeover and 104 control group firms).
35The purpose o f  this analysis is to discriminate between the takeover and nontakeover firms. That 
is, the direction o f the relationship is not specifically critical, but merely included for informational 
purposes.
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8) The dollar value o f equity ownership o f the top two officers (inverse).
9) The log of the firm ’s total market value (inverse).
10) The quick ratio (i.e., acid test) (direct).
11) The times interest earned ratio (direct).
For descriptive purposes, Table 9 documents the mean value, and difference-of- 
means t-test p-values, of the 11 variables calculated for the takeover and control group 
firms. Consistent with intuition and W RC’s/MSV’s results, (in comparison to the 
control group firms) the takeover firms have a significantly larger earnings per share 
and significantly smaller percentage of insider ownership. Inconsistent with WRC, 
however, are results that the takeover firms have a larger market value and a larger 
level of prior year sales. These latter findings suggest that sizable firms are no longer 
immune to the takeover process.
Linear discriminant analysis is performed on the 11 calculations, resulting in a 
correct classification of 85.3 percent (87 o f 102) of the takeover firms and 50.0 percent 
(52 of 104) of the control group firms. The calibration information produced by the 
discriminant analysis is stored and applied to the (1987-1993) sample of ESOP firms 
to classify them as "attractive" (i.e., firms that exhibit characteristics similar to the 
group of takeover firms) and "unattractive." Of the 180 ESOP firms examined, the 
linear discriminant analysis classified 108 as attractive. In support of this analysis, it 
should be noted that all ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity (essay 
one) are classified by the discriminant analysis as attractive for takeover.
4.3.2. "High"/"Low" Levels of Managerial Voting Power
As previously described in section 4.1.4, the determination o f low and high levels 
o f managerial voting power must account for a firm’s, and its state o f incorporation’s,
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Table 9
Descriptive statistics (i.e., mean values) and difference-of-means t-test p-values for 
the 102 takeover firms and 104 control group firms.
VARIABLE TAKEOVER
GROUP
1987-93
CONTROL
GROUP
1987-93
T-TEST
P-VALUE
(diff.-of-means)
Total Assets 3,629,398,000 5,144,622,000 .362
EPS 2.489 0.761 .046
Log (sales) 13.48 12.55 .001
PE 31.53 -14.48' .085
Mkt Val of Eqty 1,724,993,000 1,291,212,000 .343
Eqty/Assets .823 .931 .693
Sales Growth 2.60 1.02 .410
Top Off. IO % .019 .089 .001
Insider % .087 .233 .001
Top Off. $ IO 8,344,000 24,334,000 .146
Log Mkt Value 12.95 11.93 .001
Quick Ratio 1.356 1.524 .628
TIE 6.903 5.642 .502
Dbt/Eqty Ratio .535 .813 .333
1 Because a small negative EPS (the denominator of the PE ratio) produces an 
extremely large and negative PE ratio, the mean of the PEs may be an 
inappropriate measure to examine via the difference-of-means t-test. Thus, a non- 
parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test is performed to test for a difference in median 
values. A .601 p-value suggests that the PE variable is not significantly different 
between the two groups.
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supermajority provisions. To adjust for the differences in provisions, the following 
study employs an ownership ratio in which the denominator equals the percentage of 
votes necessary to prevent a takeover. Based on a comparison of the state of 
incorporation and corporate bylaw supermajority provisions, the smallest percentage 
required to prevent a takeover is used as the denominator. If no supermajority 
provision exists, the denominator is .50 (i.e., 50 percent), the percentage of votes 
necessary for management to prevent a hostile takeover. The numerator of the ratio 
is equal to the actual percentage of votes controlled by management.
Also note that because the 15 percent Delaware rule applies to non-management 
ownership, the numerator is adjusted to only include the shares owned by non­
management investors who typically vote with management (e.g., shares owned by an 
employee stock benefit plan). The denominator is equal to the product of 15 percent 
and the percentage of the firm’s nonaligned ownership.
In terms of a typical interpretation of Stulz’s model, a firm with a pre­
announcement insider ownership (pre-IO) ratio close to zero should have a positive 
reaction to the announcement of an event that increases the level of insider ownership. 
A typical Stulz interpretation also predicts that a pre-IO ratio in excess of one should 
lead to a negative reaction to such an event. In contrast, an application of essay two’s 
"pre versus post" hypothesis predicts that a firm with a pre-IO ratio close to zero and 
a post-IO ratio in excess of one will experience a negative market reaction. 
Furthermore, it is hypothesized that the value of a firm with a pre- and post-IO ratio
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in excess of one will not be affected by the ESOP-related change in voting power 
because management was firmly entrenched prior to the announcement.
The final stage of the low/high determination involves a comparison of the ESOP 
firm’s 10 ratio to the 1987-1993 takeover firms’ 10 ratios (analyzed in the "attractive 
versus unattractive" examination [section 4.3.1.]) to determine a proper low/high cut­
off measure. Of the 102 non-ESOP takeover firms, only two had an 10 ratio greater 
than .70. In addition, the five largest 10 ratios were .889, .762, .694, .677, and .675. 
This suggests that managers of firms with 10 ratios in the .70 to .80 range are firmly 
entrenched. To verify the accuracy of this range, 10 ratio cut-offs of .60, .70, .80, and 
.90 are separately applied to the four regressions (described in section 4.3.3) employed 
to determine an ESOP’s effect on managerial voting power and shareholder wealth. 
The first regression uses an 10 cut-off of .60. Therefore, if an ESOP firm has a pre­
announcement 10 ratio below .60, it is (implicitly) classified as a "low" pre-IO firm. 
If the additional ESOP shares change the post-announcement 10 ratio to a value in 
excess o f .60, it is classified as a "high" post-IO firm. Overall, the firm is classified 
as a low-high firm.
In order to determine the 10 ratio, three pieces of information are gathered: 1) the 
state of incorporation’s supermajority provisions; 2) the firm-specific supermajority 
bylaws (if any); and 3) the ownership structure of the firm. The state o f incorporation 
is recorded from CD Disclosure, and the states’ supermajority provisions (if any) are 
provided in the details of the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s (IRRC’s) 
analysis of anti-takeover statutes. IRRC data is also used as the source of firm-specific
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supermajority provisions. Finally, the firms’ ownership structures (i.e., management, 
board of directors, blockholders, and institutional ownerships) is gathered from CD- 
Disclosure, a compact disc data storage of corporate information of public companies 
filing with the SEC. Because CD-Disclosure, the source of a majority of the data used 
in this essay, is available only for the years 1987-1993, this insider ownership 
examination is restricted to the 1987-1993 time-frame.
4.3.3. Method of Analysis (ESOPs and Insider Ownership)
In addition to the pre- and post-insider ownership percentages, the magnitude of the 
change in ownership (i.e., the size of the ESOP) should affect the size of the price 
reaction. For example, Stulz’s model would predict that for low-IO firms, the positive 
market reaction increases as the magnitude of the change in 10 rises. To account for 
this factor, the difference between the "before" and "after" insider ownership ratios is 
calculated (hereafter defined as &).
To summarize the empirical structure, a standard event study procedure is 
employed to calculate the prediction errors of the ESOP announcements (section 3.3.2). 
Once obtained, the two-day (0, +  l) cumulative prediction errors (CPEs) become the 
dependent variable of the following regression36 (separately performed on "attractive" 
and "unattractive" firms):
CPEi = p ,  + P 2A , + P 3 *Z) + P 4(A ,* D )  + et (7)
“ To test for non-constant error variances o f unknown form, W hite’s (1980) direct test for 
heteroskedasticity is employed.
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where N is the number of firms in the regression, a is the percentage increase in the 
managerial ownership ratio (previously described), and D is an indicator variable equal 
to unity if  insiders subsequently have the necessary votes to prevent a potential takeover 
(zero otherwise). In effect, an interaction variable (a^D ) is used to test for a 
difference in slopes between low-low firms (D =0) and low-high firms (D = l) .37 The 
value of D is based on a comparison of the ESOP firm’s 10 ratio to the "cut-off' 
measure of the non-ESOP takeover firms’ 10 ratio, as described in the previous section. 
Cut-off measures used in the four regressions are .60, .70, .80, and .90. With respect 
to the hypotheses, it is predicted that the low-high (and attractive) firms will experience 
a significant negative reaction that increases with the size of the ESOP (i.e., /J4 <  0).
Furthermore, attractive firms with an insufficient level of "veto" votes (i.e., low- 
low firms) should receive an increase in shareholder wealth that grows with the size of 
the ESOP (i.e., 02 > 0). Thus, the dummy variable interaction (i.e., a;*D) accounts 
for the hypothesized change in the sign of the slope from positive to negative as the IO 
ratio switches from "low" to "high." This change will theoretically occur when the 
insider ownership percentage reaches a point where the benefit of an increase in the 
takeover premium no longer exceeds the cost of a decrease in takeover probability. In 
sum, a significant positive /?2, in combination with a significant negative /?4, will 
support the hypothesis that the post-insider ownership affects the level of shareholder 
wealth when an ESOP is announced.
3’The null hypothesis for the difference in slopes is H<,: 04 =  0, and the null hypothesis for the 
difference in intercepts is H„: 03 =  0.
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Though these predictions are consistent with the managerial entrenchment and 
shareholder interests hypotheses, it is further argued that they are results specifically 
related to "attractive" firms. That is, because these hypotheses pertain to the firm’s 
takeover probability and premium, an unattractive firm should have a value that is 
unaffected by the two takeover variables and any changes in ownership that affect these 
variables. In order to test this contention, a similar regression is run on the category 
of unattractive ESOP firms. Based on the argument that the shareholder interests and 
managerial entrenchment effects are lacking, the difference in slopes between 
unattractive low-low and low-high firms should be insignificant (i.e., /?4 is 
insignificantly different from zero). Recall that a significant difference is predicted for 
a similar regression of attractive firms.
4.3.4. Method of Analysis (Stockholder and Institutional Ownership)
The purpose of the following analysis is to test for an ESOP’s effect on the 
outcomes predicted by the efficient-monitoring hypothesis (section 4.2.1). This 
hypothesis contends that firm value is enhanced by the presence of blockholder and 
institutional ("outside") ownerships because of the low-cost, high-quality monitoring 
services they provide. It can also be argued that the magnitude of this monitoring 
effect and the level of outside ownership are positively related. The final contention 
is that a firm with an entrenched set of managers will have insignificant monitoring 
effects because the voting power of the outside shareholders is negated by the voting 
power of management. Given the assumed increase in managerial voting power from 
the establishment of an ESOP, it is hypothesized that firms with a high level of outside
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ownership will experience a significant drop in firm value (relative to firms with a low 
level of outside ownership) when an ESOP is announced. The drop is caused by a 
substantial decrease in the blockholders’ and institutional owners’ monitoring 
effectiveness.
To test this hypothesis, the insider ownership ratio regression (section 4.3.3, 
equation 7) is separately performed on firms with low and high levels of outside 
ownership. The hypothesized outcome is a /34 coefficient that is significantly more 
negative for firms with a high level of outside ownership than for firms with a low level 
of outside ownership. A second sub-category of regressions is performed by splitting 
the high and low "outside ownership" categories into attractive and unattractive 
stratifications. It is hypothesized that the preceding predictions are only significant for 
the attractive firms. That is, it is further predicted that the j84 coefficient is significantly 
different only for the sample of attractive firms.
4.4. Results
In general, the results support half of Stulz’s (1988) model and the entrenchment 
hypothesis. The portion of Stulz’s model supported by the findings is the contention 
that for attractive firms with an initially "low" level of managerial voting power, a 
significant negative effect is predicted for ESOPs that increase the voting power to a 
"high" level of voting power. That is, the results support the argument that a negative 
market reaction is expected for announced ESOPs that increase the managers’ voting 
power to a level of entrenchment.
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In contrast, no support is given to the shareholder interests hypothesis or the part 
of Stulz’s model that predicts a positive market reaction for ESOP firms with a low 
level of pre- and post-announcement managerial voting power. Thus, the results do not 
support Stulz’s argument that the benefit of an increase in takeover premium (from the 
ESOP-related increase in voting power) is greater than the cost of the decrease in the 
probability of a takeover.
Tables 10 through 13 each present the results for the original sets of three 
regressions, and differ by the cut-off point of the IO-ratio. Each table contains the 
results from the overall regression of 180 firms, the regression of the 108 attractive 
firms, and the regression of the 72 unattractive firms. Because a significant positive 
intercept is observed in all 12 regressions (suggesting that a significant explanatory 
variable is omitted), and based on the significant positive "repurchased equity" findings 
noted throughout essay one, Tables 14 through 17 include a repurchased equity 
indicator variable. Aside from shifting the significant positive effect from the intercept 
to the indicator variable and increasing the explanatory power of the regression (as 
measured by R2), the results of Tables 14 through 17 are comparable to those of Tables 
10 through 13.
The most notable results come from the regressions of attractive firms that use a 
low-high 10 cut-off measure of .70 and .80 (Tables 11, 12, 15, and 16; equation 2).38 
In particular, a significant negative effect is noted for attractive firms that announce an 
ESOP that increases the level of managerial voting power from "low" to "high" (per
“ Recall (from section 4.3.2) that the analysis o f non-ESOP hostile takeover firms suggests that 
managers are firmly entrenched with IO ratios in the .70 to .80 range.
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Table 10
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.60 cut-off).
MODEL: CPE; =  j3, +  +  &*D +  0 4(a *D )  +  e<
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value
Intercept .024 .000 .019 .003 .047 .015
A| -.055 .157 -.039 .243 .028 .854
D -.019 .069 -.030 .142 -.043 .052
A|*D .046 .271 .034 .407 -.043 .895
(1) =  Total sample (180 firms) (F Value =  2.19, P-Value =  .0907; R2 =  .036)
(2) =  Attractive (108 firms) (F Value =  3.01, P-Value =  .0334; R2 =  .080)
(3) =  Unattractive (72 firms) (F Value =  1.53, P-Value =  .2155; R2 =  .063)
Table 11
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction 
errors (.70 cut-off).
MODEL: CPE, =  f t  +  (32*a -, +  03*D +  0 4(a * D )  +  e,
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
V ariables P aram eter
E stim ate
P-V alue P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
Intercept .021 .002 .018 .004 .029 .070
-.037 .298 -.034 .282 .030 .803
D -.014 .169 -.049 .015 -.021 .281
a(*D .026 .512 .047 .241 -.028 .821
(1) =  Total sample (180 firms) (F Value =  1.73, P-Value =  .1619; R2 =  .029)
(2) =  Attractive (108 firms) (F Value =  4.37, P-Value =  .0061; R2 =  .111)
(3) =  Unattractive (72 firms) (F Value =  0.61, P-Value =  .6089; R2 =  .026)
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Table 12
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.80 cut-off).
MODEL: CPEi =  0, +  02*a , +  ft*D  +  /34(a*D) +  e.
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
V ariables P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
In te rcep t .021 .002 .017 .004 .029 .056
A| -.036 .221 -.029 .271 -.038 .622
D -.015 .173 -.057 .016 -.023 .249
a,*D .025 .463 .049 .184 .045 .589
(1) =  Total sample (180 firms) (F Value =  1.70, P-Value =  .1678; R2 =  .028)
(2) =  Attractive (108 firms) (F Value =  4.26, P-Value =  .0070; R2 =  .107)
(3) =  Unattractive (72 firms) (F Value =  0.48, P-Value =  .6944; R2 =  .022)
Table 13
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction 
errors (.90 cut-off).
MODEL: CPEj =  f t  +  j82*A; +  /33*D +  |84(a * D )  +  e.
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
V ariables P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
Intercept .022 .001 .019 .002 .031 .046
A -.057 .038 -.053 .032 -.041 .607
D -.014 .201 -.016 .504 -.026 .206
a,*D .048 .138 .038 .284 .054 .525
(1) =  Total sample (180 firms) (F Value =  1.88, P-Value =  .1348; R2 =  .031)
(2) =  Attractive (108 firms) (F Value =  2.52, P-Value =  .0614; R2 =  .065)
(3) =  Unattractive (72 firms) (F Value =  0.56, P-Value =  .6466; R2 =  .026)
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Table 14
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.60 cut-off) (Includes a repurchased equity indicator variable).
MODEL: CPE; =  j8j +  /?2*Ai +  03*D +  04(a*D) +  0 s*REP +  e,
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables P aram eter
Estim ate
P-V alue P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value
Intercept .004 .592 -.004 .641 .027 .193
Al -.053 .157 -.039 .208 .090 .556
D -.018 .084 -.028 .142 -.045 .034
a,*D .045 .269 .029 .451 -.074 .633
REP .028 .000 .032 .000 .034 .024
(1) =  Total sample (180 firms) (F Value =  5.52, P-Value =  .0003; =  .112)
(2) =  Attractive (108 firms) (F Value =  7.41, P-Value =  .0001; R2 =  .223)
(3) =  Unattractive (72 firms) (F Value =  2.56, P-Value =  .0466; R2 =  .132)
Table 15
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction 
errors (.70 cut-off) (Includes a repurchased equity indicator variable).
MODEL: CPE; =  f t  +  j32*Ai +  03*D -I- 04(a*D) +  /35*REP +  ej
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
V ariables P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value
Intercept .001 .876 -.002 .718 .001 .683
-.038 .276 -.037 .216 .055 .642
D -.012 .236 -.047 .012 -.019 .305
Ai*D .026 .496 .045 .218 -.046 .704
REP .028 .000 .030 .000 .032 .028
(2) =  Attractive (108 firms)
(3) =  Unattractive (72 firms)
(F Value =  7.89, P-Value =  .0001; R2 =  .234) 
(F Value =  1.75, P-Value =  .1489; R2 =  .096)
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Table 16
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction
errors (.80 cut-off) (Includes a repurchased equity indicator variable).
MODEL: CPE; =  0, +  0 2 %  +  03*D +  0 4(a*D ) +  0 3*REP -I- e,
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value
Intercept .001 .914 -.002 .726 .007 .698
A| -.039 .161 -.032 .194 -.045 .548
D -.011 .302 -.053 .017 -.020 .313
a,*D .027 .392 .047 .175 .060 .458
REP .028 .000 .028 .000 .033 .035
(1) =  Total sample (180 firms) (F Value =  5.00, P-Value =  .0008; R2 =  .102)
(2) =  Attractive (108 firms) (F Value =  7.31, P-Value =  .0001; R2 =  .216)
(3) =  Unattractive (72 firms) (F Value =  1.54, P-Value =  .2015; R2 =  .088)
Table 17
OLS regression results explaining the ESOP two-day announcement prediction 
errors (.90 cut-off) (Includes a repurchased equity indicator variable).
MODEL: CPE; =  0, +  02*Ai +  03*D +  0 4(a*D ) +  03*REP +  e*
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
V ariables P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
Intercept .001 .845 -.001 .817 .008 .671
-.055 .037 -.050 .032 -.047 .541
D -.008 .429 -.016 .461 -.020 .311
a,*D .044 .151 .034 .301 .066 .433
REP .029 .000 .029 .000 .032 .043
(1)'=  Total sample (180 firms) (F Value = 5727"^V'alue = i0005; R2 =  .107)
(2) =  Attractive (108 firms) (F Value =  5.86, P-Value =  .0003; R2 =  .177)
(3) =  Unattractive (72 firms) (F Value =  1.51, P-Value =  .2119; R2 =  .089)
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This is supportive of the parameter estimate of the indicator variable, D). That is, the 
parameter estimates (p-values) of -.049 (.015), -.057 (.016), -.047 (.012), and -.053 
(.017) from Tables 11, 12, 15, and 16, respectively, support the argument that the 
market reacts negatively to an announced ESOP if it increases the managerial voting 
power to a level of entrenchment. In contrast, similar significant effects are non­
existent for the sample of unattractive firms. Therefore, in addition to supporting the 
managerial entrenchment, and "low-high" voting power, hypotheses, these results are 
consistent with the argument that the market discriminates between firms that are 
attractive and unattractive for takeover.
Finally, consistent with the findings of essay one, a significant positive effect is 
noted for ESOPs structured with repurchased equity (Tables 14-17, variable REP). 
This is supportive of an asymmetric information argument that the market infers 
positive news from the repurchased equity announcement because it suggests that 
management believes the equity is undervalued.
4.4.1. Results (Blockholder/Institutional Ownership)
The majority of institutional/blockholder ("outsider") ownership results are 
unsupportive o f the general contention that an ESOP-related increase in managerial 
voting power affects firm value by decreasing the outsiders’ monitoring effectiveness.
It is hypothesized that firms with a high level of outside ownership experience an 
increase in shareholder wealth from the blockholder participation and blockholder 
opposition effects (section 4.2.1). It is further argued that these positive effects are 
negated by an entrenched set of managers. Based on the analysis and comparison of
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ESOP firms with low and high levels of outside ownership (external monitoring), the 
results are predominantly insignificant.
Tables 18, 20, 22, and 24 provide the regression results for ESOP firms with a 
high level of outside ownership and a low-high "entrenchment" cut-off of .60, .70, .80, 
and .90, respectively. A similar format is used for firms with a low level of outside 
ownership in Tables 19, 21, 23, and 25. It is specifically argued that the indicator 
variable’s (D) and interaction variable’s (A*D) effects are significant and negative for 
firms with a high level of outside ownership. The negative reactions are expected 
because the positive monitoring effects are negated by firms with a managerial voting 
power that reaches a level of entrenchment. Conversely, insignificant effects are 
predicted for ESOP firms with low outside ownership. Aside from a handful of 
coefficients exhibiting a significant relationship with the firms’ two-day (0, +  l) 
prediction errors, the results are unsupportive o f the blockholder/institutional ownership 
hypotheses.
In addition to the possibility that no outside ownership effect exists, the insignificant 
effects could be attributed to two additional factors. First, the method used to separate 
the firms into low and high outside ownership categories is inadequate. In other words, 
the process of comparing each firm’s level of outside ownership to that of the sample 
firms’ median (to determine "low" or "high" outside ownership) could be greatly 
improved if  the median of all NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq firms was used as the low/high 
benchmark. Unfortunately, time and data constraints do not allow for such a 
procedure. Second, the further stratification of the 117 attractive and 72 unattractive
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Table 18
OLS regression results relating the level of institutional/blockholder (outside) 
ownership to the ESOP two-day announcement prediction errors (.60 cut-off) 
(High external monitoring).
MODEL: CPEf =  0 , +  0 2*Aj +  &*D +  0 4(a*D ) -I- e,
(1) (D (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value
Intercept .0195 .0038 .0212 .0084 .0073 .7323
-.0736 .0403 -.0787 .0501 -.1119 .3876
D -.0207 .0976 -.0259 .2451 -.0090 .7337
a,+D .0613 .1208 .0685 .1439 .1064 .4349
(1) =  Total sample (86 firms) (F Value =  2.53, P-Value =  .0625; R2 =  .084)
(2) =  Attractive (65 firms) (F Value =  2.58, P-Value =  .0613; R2 =  .112)
(3) =  Unattractive (21 firms) (F Value =  0.39, P-Value =  .7641; R2 =  .064)
Table 19
OLS regression results relating the level of outside ownership to the ESOP two- 
day announcement prediction errors (.60 cut-off) (Low external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE; =  0, +  0 ^ ;  +  03*D +  0 4(a*D ) +  e;
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value
Intercept .0276 .0459 .0135 .2244 .0644 .1306
*1 -.0074 .9280 .0374 .5449 .0757 .8744
D -.0213 .2330 -.0671 .3945 -.0574 .1982
A|*D .0108 .9003 .0183 .9004 -.0645 .8931
(1) =  Total sample (93 firms) (F Value =  0.90, P-Value =  .4454; R2 =  .029)
(2) =  Attractive (42 firms) (F Value =  1.42, P-Value =  .2532; R2 =  .101)
(3) =  Unattractive (51 firms) (F Value =  1.68, P-Value =  .1849; R2 =  .097)
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Table 20
OLS regression results relating the level o f outside ownership to the ESOP two-
day announcement prediction errors (.70 cut-off) (High external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE; =  0 , +  0 2*Aj + 03*D +  0 4(a* D ) +  e,
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
Intercept .0153 .0264 .0192 .0133 .0022 .9016
-.0459 .1573 -.0623 .0837 -.0097 .9145
D -.0133 .3063 -.0275 .2290 .0043 .8632
a,+D .0272 .4580 .0539 .2173 -.0184 .8557
(1) =  Total sample (86 firms) (F Value =  2.15, P-Value =  .1008; R2 =  .073)
(2) =  Attractive (65 firms) (F Value =  2.42, P-Value =  .0744; R2 =  . 106)
(3) =  Unattractive (21 firms) (F Value =  0.15, P-Value =  .9313; R2 =  .025)
Table 21
OLS regression results relating the level o f outside ownership to the ESOP two- 
day announcement prediction errors (.70 cut-off) (Low external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE; =  0, +  02*A; +  03*D +  0 4(a*D ) +  e.
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
Intercept .0244 .0564 .0134 .2229 .0285 .3525
A| .0068 .9313 .0374 .5437 .3521 .4078
D -.0184 .2983 -. 1202 .0198 -.0181 .5922
a,*D -.0028 .9729 .1025 .3549 -.3431 .4213
(1) = Total sample (93 firms) (F Value =  0.78, P-Value =  .5108; R2 =  .025)
(2) =  Attractive (42 firms) (F Value =  3.80, P-Value =  .0176; R2 =  .226)
(3) =  Unattractive (51 firms) (F Value =  1.04, P-Value =  .3854; R2 =  .063)
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Table 22
OLS regression results relating the outside ownership to the ESOP two-day
announcement prediction errors (.80 cut-off) (High external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE; =  0, +  +  03*D -I- 0 4(a*D ) +  e,
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value Parameter
Estimate
P-Value
Intercept .0144 .0285 .0171 .0208 .0066 .6918
Ai -.0350 .2008 -.0465 .1363 -.0055 .9306
D -.0191 .1816 -.0348 .2067 -.0030 .9065
a,*D .0200 .5410 .0455 .2754 -.0410 .6408
(1) =  Total sample (86 firms) (F Value =  2.45, P-Value =  .0693; R2 =  .082)
(2) =  Attractive (65 firms) (F Value =  2.35, P-Value =  .0807; R2 =  .102)
(3) =  Unattractive (21 firms) (F Value =  0.36, P-Value =  .7800; R2 =  .064)
Table 23
OLS regression results relating the level of outside ownership to the ESOP two- 
day announcement prediction errors (.80 cut-ofi) (Low external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE; =  0 , +  0 2*a, + /33*D +  /34(a*D ) +  e ,
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
V ariables P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value
Intercept .0261 .0253 .0159 .1239 .0455 .0645
-.0242 .6863 .0061 .9004 -.0766 .6586
D -.0198 .2570 -.1209 .0274 -.0359 .2168
&i*D .0292 .6606 .1107 .2530 .0894 .6140
(1) =  Total sample (93 firms) (F Value =  0.56, P-Value =  .6425; R2 =  .018)
(2) =  Attractive (42 firms) (F Value =  2.77, P-Value =  .0540; R2 =  .172)
(3) =  Unattractive (51 firms) (F Value =  0.58, P-Value =  .6343; R2 =  .037)
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Table 24
OLS regression results relating the level o f outside ownership to the ESOP two-
day announcement prediction errors (.90 cut-off) (High external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE, =  0, +  j82*Ai +  03*D +  0 4(a*D ) +  e.
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value
Intercept .0169 .0092 .0204 .0044 .0066 .6918
*1 -.0581 .0208 -.0736 .0080 -.0055 .9306
D -.0160 .2762 .0101 .7899 -.0030 .9065
a,*D .0446 .1485 .0393 .3601 -.0411 .6408
(1) =  Total sample (86 firms) (F Value =  2.53, P-Value =  .0625; R2 =  .084)
(2) =  Attractive (65 firms) (F Value =  3.03, P-Value =  .0358; R2 =  .128)
(3) =  Unattractive (21 firms) (F Value =  0.36, P-Value =  .7800; R2 =  .0638)
Table 25
OLS regression results relating the outside ownership to the ESOP two-day 
announcement prediction errors (.90 cut-off) (Low external monitoring).
MODEL: CPE, =  0, +  j82*A, +  &*D +  /34(a*D ) +  e.
(1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Variables P aram eter
Estim ate
P-V alue P aram eter
E stim ate
P-Value P aram eter
Estim ate
P-Value
Intercept .0261 .0240 .0142 .1904 .0465 .0572
-.0348 .5608 -.0009 .9861 -.0792 .6534
D -.0179 .3133 -.0149 .6974 -.0383 .1953
Aj+D .0396 .5519 -.0219 .7813 .1009 .5770
(1) =  Total sample (93 firms) (F Value =  0.41, P-Value =  .7456; R2 =  .013)
(2) =  Attractive (42 firms) (F Value =  0.72, P-Value =  .5428; R2 =  .048)
(3) =  Unattractive (51 firms) (F Value =  0.62, P-Value =  .6076; R2 =  .042)
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firms by their level of outside ownership reduces the size of the sub-samples to the 
extent that it is difficult to observe a relationship between outside ownership and an 
ESOP’s effect on managerial voting power.
4.5. Conclusion
Regardless of the results, this essay is important because of the three analytical 
improvements it provides to the insider ownership/corporate control research. First, 
it contends that the results of this area of research are only pertinent to firms that 
possess qualities that make them "attractive" for takeover. Including "unattractive" 
firms (e.g., firms that are too large or unprofitable) into the analysis serves only to 
dilute the overall effects. The findings of essay two support this argument with the 
significant effects for attractive firms announcing an ESOP, and insignificant results for 
unattractive ones.
Essay two also improves upon prior studies by specifically accounting for the 
effects of a firm’s, and its state of incorporation’s, supermajority provisions on the 
voting power of management. Prior research considers firms with equal percentages 
o f insider ownership to have an equal level of managerial voting power. Essay two 
contends that firms with supermajority provisions will have a stronger degree of 
managerial voting power because of the smaller percentage of votes necessary to 
prevent a takeover. Thus, instead of using the percentage of insider ownership as the 
measure of managerial voting power (as does all prior research), essay two employs an 
insider ownership ratio in which the denominator is the percentage of votes necessary 
to prevent a takeover and the numerator is the percentage of votes controlled by
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management. Though the results of essay two can not be specifically applied to support 
the value of this ratio (in terms o f finance research), the intuitive application is obvious.
The third improvement over prior research is the incorporation of a firm’s pre- and 
/wwf-announcement level of managerial voting power. In contrast, prior research 
typically concentrates on the pre-announcement level of ownership. The post­
announcement level is critical, however, because it is the dominant factor in the 
determination as to whether managers have the necessary votes to entrench themselves. 
The difference in the predicted effects is particularly evident for firms with an initially 
low level of managerial voting power that is increased (by the ESOP) to a level of 
entrenchment. Prior research typically predicts a positive effect because it focuses on 
the "low" pre-announcement level of voting power. Conversely, essay two predicts a 
negative market reaction because the post-announcement level of managerial voting 
power is sufficient to veto all hostile takeover attempts. The results support this latter 
contention with the significant negative effect found for attractive firms announcing an 
ESOP that increases the level o f managerial voting power (as proxied by the insider 
ownership ratio) from low to high. Furthermore, in support of the contention that the 
market discriminates between firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover, 
insignificant results were noted for the "low-high" unattractive firms.
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Chapter 5 
Essay Three: Insider Trading
5.1. Introduction
Essay three examines the trading activities of managers ("insiders") in the stock of 
their firm around the announcement of an ESOP. The analysis is partitioned to address 
two general questions. First, is there a relationship between the structure of the ESOP 
(and the resulting stock price reaction) and the insiders’ trading activities? Second, 
based on the assumption that ESOPs increase a firm’s managerial voting power, does 
management see this as an opportunity to reduce their personal (cash-flow) ownership, 
yet still maintain a sufficient level of voting power (entrenchment)?
Given the relatively consistent market reactions to various security-related 
announcements,39 managers are afforded the opportunity to exploit their private 
information by adjusting their insider trading around the announcement. Despite the 
threat o f SEC-imposed penalties, significant insider trading activity prior to securities 
issuance announcements has been noted in several empirical examinations. For 
example, Karpoff and Lee (1991) find a significant level of insider sales prior to the 
announcements of common stock and convertible debt offerings. The initial 
presumption is that the insiders are reducing their cash-flow ownership prior to the 
release of negative news to prevent a drop in personal wealth. Similarly, Lee, 
Mikkelson, and Partch (1989) find a systematic increase in net insider purchases prior 
to the announcement of a tender offer repurchase, an announcement typically associated
39For example, the market’s reaction to a non-ESOP common stock issuance (repurchase) 
announcement is typically negative (positive)(Smith, 1986).
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with a stock price increase. The findings suggest that managers use private information 
about the forthcoming announcement to enhance their personal wealth.
In a similar fashion, one purpose of this essay is to focus on the securities issuance 
structure of the ESOP and analyze the level of insider trading activity in the pre- and 
post-announcement periods. The preservation and enhancement of insiders’ wealth is 
analyzed by associating their net trading activity with the cumulative prediction errors 
noted in section 3.4, Tables 5 and 6. Furthermore, assuming that abnormal insider 
trading activity is a proxy for private information (John and Mishra, 1990), the results 
are additional evidence of the reasonableness of the asymmetric information arguments 
discussed in essay one. Supportive examples would be announcements with a 
significant level of net insider sell-offs prior to ESOPs structured with convertible 
preferred shares, and net insider purchases prior to announcements of repurchased 
equity ESOPs. The sell-off (purchase) infers to the market that the stock is overpriced 
(underpriced), an inference consistent with the asymmetric information arguments.
This essay also examines the interactions between an ESOP’s effect on managerial 
voting power and the insider trading activities surrounding the announcement. It is 
hypothesized that the ESOP-related effects will differ from those of a comparable non- 
ESOP securities issuance announcement. For example, a significant insider sell-off and 
a subsequent non-ESOP issue of common stock40 will always reduce the level of 
managerial voting power. The reduction is caused by a decrease in shares owned by 
management and an increase in shares outstanding. Management concerned with their
“T h is  scenario is consistent with the findings o f Karpoff and Lee (1991).
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level of voting power (for entrenchment purposes) may, therefore, be impelled to 
reduce the level of personal shares sold to prevent a significant decrease in voting 
power.
In comparison, given the assumption that the ESOP shares are aligned with 
management, an insider sell-off and ESOP-related common stock issuance can actually 
result in an increase in managerial voting power. That is, even though the manager’s 
personal ownership is reduced, the number of shares they control (personal ownership 
plus ESOP shares) may increase. The additional voting power, therefore, provides 
management with an opportunity to alter its trading patterns.
In effect, a comparison of ESOP and non-ESOP insider trading activities would 
provide indirect information about the market for corporate control and insider voting 
power. An ESOP firms’ insiders should have greater flexibility in their trading activity 
because of the aligned votes provided by the ESOP formation. Because the ESOP 
firms’ managers can maintain or increase their corporate control despite a sell-off of 
personal shares, the optimal level of managerial shares sold is effectively expanded. 
In contrast, non-ESOP managers concerned with their level of voting power do not have 
this additional flexibility and, therefore, must reduce the level of their personal equity 
sell-off.
Furthermore, the "attractive-firm" theory examined in essay two hypothesizes that 
the corporate control effects on insider trading differ for attractive and unattractive 
firms. It is argued that managers of unattractive firms are able to sell a greater 
percentage of their shares than managers of attractive firms because of their firm’s low
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takeover probability. An example supportive of the attractive-firm theory is the finding 
of a(n) significant (insignificant) insider sell-off prior to an ESOP announced by an 
unattractive (attractive) firm. In other words, despite the opportunity to preserve their 
wealth, the managers of attractive firms will retain their shares to maintain or increase 
their level o f voting power. It should be noted, however, that these "flexibility" 
arguments assume that the insiders are relatively undeterred by the SEC insider trading 
penalties.
5.1.1. Insider Trading and the Structure of ESOPs
Despite the fact that the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 considers it illegal 
to trade on (profit from) private information, previous research has consistently shown 
that insiders such as officers and directors earn significant returns from the trades in 
the stock of their firm (e.g., Jaffe, 1974, Finnerty, 1976, and Seyhun, 1986). The 
findings suggest that there is intensive (abnormal) insider buying activity prior to 
favorable stock price movements and abnormal selling activity prior to unfavorable 
price movements.
Evidence associating insider trades with firm-specific press releases is also sizable. 
Significant profitable insider trading activity is noted prior to earnings announcements 
(Penman, 1982), securities issuance announcements (Karpoff and Lee, 1991), tender 
offer repurchase announcements (Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch, 1989), and LBOs 
(Harlow and Howe, 1993). Givoly and Palmon (1985) find an insignificant correlation 
between a firm’s insider trades and a subsequent material press release (e.g., earnings
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announcements), but note that the stock price tends to increase (decrease) in months 
subsequent to intensive insider buying (selling) activities.
Though numerous studies support the connection between irregular insider trading 
activities and firm-specific announcements, the research of interest to essay three relates 
to the trades made by insiders prior to security-related announcements. In particular, 
Karpoff and Lee (1991) and Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1989) provide indirect 
evidence in support of the hypothesis that the securities issuance structure of the ESOP 
has a material effect on the trades made by management. Providing direct evidence of 
the association between the ESOP structure and insider trading activities is one purpose 
of this essay.
Karpoff and Lee examine the volume of insider trades transacted in the months 
surrounding the announcement of common stock, convertible debt, and straight debt 
issues. Because insider trading research and the asymmetric information hypothesis 
commonly assume that management is privy to critical information about the true value 
o f the firm, an integration of these research areas, as they relate to the securities 
issuance process, is appropriate. For example, Myers and M ajluf s (1984) asymmetric 
information hypothesis contends that a primary offering of common stock implies that 
management believes that their firm’s equity is overvalued, and is the basis of the 
predicted negative market reaction when the issuance is announced (Asquith and 
Mullins, 1986, Masulis and Korwar, 1986, and Mikkelson and Partch, 1986). 
Assuming that management is privy to the forthcoming announcement and is aware of 
the typical negative market reaction, and given the assumption that investors (including
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insiders) are wealth-maximizing individuals, it is logical to conclude that management 
may use their inside information to preserve their personal wealth. Thus, it is 
hypothesized that a "preservation of wealth" objective leads management to sell their 
equity prior to the (negative) announcement. Karpoff and Lee support this argument 
with their finding of a significant level of net selling activity prior to the announcements 
of common stock issuances.
A similar insider trading/asymmetric information association holds for convertible 
debt offerings. The asymmetric information hypothesis contends that a convertible debt 
issuance announcement suggests to the market that management possesses private 
negative information about the underlying equity. The overall effect is a downward 
revaluation of the firm’s equity by the market (Linn and Pinegar, 1985, and Mikkelson 
and Partch, 1986). Once again, it is hypothesized that management will attempt to 
preserve their wealth by selling their personal equity prior to the convertible debt 
announcement. Karpoff and Lee support this contention with their finding of a 
significant level of insider equity sell-offs in the months preceding the announcement.
Finally, Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch’s (1989) analysis of insider trading activity 
around the announcement of a tender offer repurchase also supports the insider 
trading/asymmetric information connection. The asymmetric information hypothesis 
suggests that tender offer repurchases are motivated by management’s belief that the 
stock is greatly undervalued. The inference typically results in a significant stock price 
increase on the day of the announcement (Dann, 1981, and Vermaelen, 1981). In 
relation to insider trading and the assumption of maximizing an investor’s personal
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wealth, a significant level of insider equity purchases prior to the announcement is 
predicted and observed by Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch.
In sum, there is substantial support for the argument that managers take advantage 
of their inside information when buying and selling their personal equity holdings in the 
months surrounding a non-ESOP securities issuance announcement. Given the 
significance of the ESOP’s securities issuance structure on shareholder wealth (essay 
one), and based on the non-ESOP insider trading research noted above, one purpose of 
essay three is to directly test for the association between the asymmetric information 
hypothesis and the level of insider trading around the ESOP announcement.
A second, closely related, purpose is to provide support for the contention that an 
insider’s goal of wealth maximization affects the trading activities around a material 
(ESOP) announcement. The specific hypothesis associated with this last contention is 
that managers will have significant net purchases (sell-offs) prior to the announcement 
o f ESOPs associated with significant positive (negative) prediction errors. Such 
findings are also consistent with John and Mishra (1990), who contend that insider 
trading and the firm’s announcement are used as a joint signal to disseminate 
information to the market.
5.1.2. Takeover Attractiveness, Voting Power, and Insider Trading
Essay three also examines the effects of a firm’s managerial voting power and 
takeover attractiveness on the insider trades transacted in the immediate months 
surrounding an ESOP announcement. The connection between ESOPs and changes in 
managerial voting power surrounding the announcement was first presented by Chang
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and Mayers (1992), but analyzed with less statistical rigor than the research conducted 
here. Chang and Mayers first attempt to explain the negative coefficient of the "ESOP 
size/insider ownership" interaction variable41 attached to firms with prior insider 
ownership in excess of 40 percent. They argue that ESOPs announced by these firms 
are signals of a subsequent sell-off of insider-owned shares. The sell-off translates into 
an increase in agency costs caused by the reduced alignment of interests between 
management and the shareholders. Furthermore, even though managers of the "40+ %" 
firms are decreasing their personal (cash-flow) ownership, the overall level of 
managerial voting control (entrenchment) is unaffected because of the increase in 
management-aligned ESOP shares. Thus, a decrease in the alignment of interests 
without a lowering of entrenchment results in a decrease in firm value. A similar 
argument is presented by Mikkelson and Partch (1993) in their analysis of the post­
performance of ESOP firms.
It should also be noted that ESOPs described in this manner are quite similar to 
dual-class recapitalizations. In particular, Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) analyze the dual­
class restructurings of 94 firms (1976-1986) in which shareholders were given the 
opportunity to receive a newly created, limited voting rights stock in exchange for their 
"high-vote" shares of equity. Even though the shareholders approved the 
restructurings, the sample of recapitalization announcements exhibited a significant 
negative market reaction.42 The similarity with ESOPs pertains to the fact that the
“"Chang and M ayers’ regression is described in section 4.1.2.
42Partch (1987) finds non-negutive price reactions to the 44 recapitalization announcements made 
between 1962 and 1984.
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managers are given the opportunity to increase their high vote/low-cash-flow shares and 
decrease their ownership of low vote/high-cash-flow equity. ESOPs and dual-class 
recapitalizations, therefore, allow management the opportunity to retain their voting 
control, yet reduce their cash-flow ownership. A final similarity is the finding by 
Jarrell and Poulsen that the negative prediction errors are larger for firms with a high 
level of insider ownership prior to the announcement. One important difference 
between the two events, however, is the fact that the high vote/low-cash-flow shares 
are costly to the insider (i.e., the shares must be purchased or exchanged for value), 
while ESOP shares effectively increase the insiders’ voting power with no direct cost 
to the managers.
Returning to the Chang and Mayers "40+" contention, general support for their 
argument involves a pre- and post-ESOP comparison of insider ownership, where 
ownership is calculated as a percentage o f total shares outstanding. For the "40+ 
percent" category of analyzed ESOPs (sample size =  13), an average decrease in 
insider ownership of 14.8 percent, and an average increase in ESOP ownership of 11.9 
percent, is calculated by the authors. This result suggests that a sizable sell-off of 
insider shares has occurred. Given the mathematics of the analysis, and the presence 
of a few extreme percentages, the results are likely to be misleading, however. For 
example, a firm with a pre-announcement insider ownership (pre-IO) level of 50 
percent that established a common stock ESOP of 30 percent43 would experience a 12 
percent drop in insider ownership without the sale of a single insider share. With
43That is, the number o f  shares outstanding is increased by 30 percent.
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respect to the "extreme percentages", four of the 13 firms experience a drop in insider 
ownership in excess of 30 percent, events that undoubtedly have a significant effect on 
the overall results.
The termination of a manager may also cause a large decrease in the level of 
insider ownership. As noted by Mikkelson and Partch, 20 of the 52 (38 percent) ESOP 
firms examined by the authors replaced their CEO within three years of the 
announcement. To be relevant to this argument, however, the termination must occur 
between Chang and Mayers’ pre- and post-announcement dates, a plausible event given 
the fact that their "post" percentage data were gathered from the second proxy statement 
subsequent to the ESOP announcement. To improve on the generalities and potentially 
incorrect inferences of previous research, this essay performs a direct examination of 
the actual insider trading activities.
It should finally be noted that Chang and Mayers also analyze the relation between 
the percentage change in insider ownership (in addition to their 20-plus other 
explanatory variables) and the announcement’s prediction error. For firms with a pre- 
IO level in excess of 40 percent, they find a weakly significant relationship between the 
percentage change in insider ownership and the prediction error. Their results suggest 
that the larger the decrease in insider ownership, the more negative the response to the 
announced ESOP. This, however, implicitly assumes that the market is aware of the 
magnitude of the change in insider ownership at the time o f the ESOP announcement. 
Given the three-year period used to calculate the change in insider ownership, this 
statistical relationship may be spurious. In other words, if the insider sell-off occurs
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subsequent to the ESOP announcement (i.e., it is an action unknown to the market at 
the time of the ESOP announcement), why should there be a relationship between the 
prediction error and the magnitude of the change in insider ownership?
To test the validity of this critical assumption, this essay examines the relation 
between the ESOP-related prediction error and the actual level of insider trading 
activity transacted prior to the announcement. In sum, essay three analyses the 
relationships between insider trading activity, voting power, and a firm’s takeover 
attractiveness by directly examining the trading activities.
5.2. Hypotheses
The first part of this essay three examines the interactions between the securities 
issuance structure of an ESOP and the insider trades transacted in the immediate months 
surrounding the announcement. Consistent with the non-ESOP findings of Lee, 
Mikkelson, and Partch (1989), the first hypothesis of essay three is as follows:
12) For ESOPs structured with repurchased equity, significant insider purchases are 
predicted in the period preceding the announcement.
Based on the asymmetric information argument that the market will react positively 
to the simultaneous repurchase announcement, and given the belief that an insider’s goal 
is to maximize his/her personal wealth, the hypothesis suggests that management will 
increase its personal ownership prior to the release of the positive information.
In contrast, because the revised asymmetric information hypothesis (section 3.1.2) 
predicts a significant negative market reaction to ESOPs structured with convertible 
preferred equity, the goal of wealth maximization implies the following:
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13) Insiders will significantly increase the level of personal sales in the period prior 
to an announced ESOP structured with convertible preferred equity.
In general, the goal of wealth maximization would suggest that insiders will alter 
their trading patterns around all announcements (e.g., ESOPs) that have a significant 
effect on firm value. In particular:
14) Insiders will engage in a significant level of net purchases (sales) prior to the 
announcement of ESOPs associated with significant positive (negative) shareholder 
wealth effects.
By including the argument that managers of "attractive" firms will want to maintain 
or increase the level of managerial voting power, it is further argued that the preceding 
hypotheses only apply to firms that are unattractive for takeover. To be specific:
15) The effects predicted in hypotheses 13) and 14) are only significant for firms that 
are unattractive for takeover.
Finally, the revised asymmetric information hypothesis contends that ESOPs 
structured with previously unissued common stock will have a non-negative effect on 
shareholder wealth. Combined with the contention that managers are concerned with 
maximizing personal wealth, the following hypothesis is formed:
16) ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock will have no effect on 
the trading strategies of insiders in the shares of their firm.
5.3. Data and Method of Analysis
Essay three examines the trading activity of managers in the stock of their firm 
around the announcement of the establishment and expansion of an ESOP. The initial
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sample of ESOP firms analyzed within is identical to the 319 ESOP firms examined in 
the first essay. Of these, the 65 announced outside the July 1986 - May 1992 period 
are excluded due to unavailability of insider trading data.
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires the timely filing of all trading 
activity by corporate officers, directors, and holders of more than ten percent of a given 
security (i.e., a blockholder). The trade must be filed before the tenth day of the 
following month and is documented in the SEC’s Ownership Reporting System (ORS) 
data files, the source of this essay’s data. In order to concentrate on the managers’ 
(insiders’) trading activities, only open market purchases and sales made by the firms’ 
officers and directors are examined in essay three. Trades of outside blockholders and 
amended, inconsistent, or late filings are excluded from the sample.
In general terms, essay three compares the firms’ average insider trading activities 
in the event-period (bounded by the 24 months surrounding the announcement)44 to 
those transacted during the estimation-period (consisting of all months outside the 24- 
month event-period boundary). The means of three trading activity measures (defined 
in the following paragraph) are calculated for each event-window and estimation-period, 
and a two-sample difference-of-means test is used to examine the various hypotheses 
of abnormal insider trading activity around the ESOP announcement. For example, 
when analyzing ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock, a finding that the
■“Based on methods similar to Boehmer (1991), essay three examines the average trading activity in 
the following event windows: (-12 months, 0), (-6 months, 0), and (0, + 6  months), where 0 denotes the 
day o f  the ESOP announcement and months are measured relative to that day. Because the number of 
ESOP firms with trading activity in these three event periods may differ, the average estimation-period 
activity may also differ across event-window periods.
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average number of net insider sales in the (-6, 0) event window is significantly larger 
than the average number of net sales in the estimation period is supportive of the 
revised asymmetric information hypothesis.
The three measures of trading activity calculated from the ORS data and used in this 
analysis are: 1) the net number of shares purchased; 2) the net dollar value of shares 
purchased; and 3) the proportion of trades in the period which are purchases. The third 
measure ranges from zero to one, with a mean in excess of .5 indicating a period of 
time in which the number of insider purchases exceeds the number of insider sales. 
The means of the first two measures range from negative to positive infinity, with 
negative values indicating a larger number o f shares and dollar value of shares, 
respectively, sold than bought.
To test for significantly different means between the estimation- and event-period 
measures (i.e., testing for abnormal insider trading around the announcement), a 
binomial distribution is assumed for the third measure, and a continuous distribution for 
the first and second. Given the additional assumption that the estimation- and event- 
period measures are normally distributed, a standard t-test is employed to test the 
hypothesis that the means of the event- and estimation-period measures are equal. In 
order to avoid these distributional assumptions, a non-para metric test statistic is also 
calculated, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test statistic, to test the hypothesis that the 
estimation- and event-period data are drawn from the same population.
Three sets of tables are constructed to detail the results relevant to: 1) the 
asymmetric information hypotheses stated in the first essay; 2) the attractive/unattractive
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arguments of essay two; and 3) the preservation (or enhancement) o f personal wealth 
(essay three). The information in these tables also provides cursory evidence about the 
deterrent effects o f the SEC insider trading penalties.
The first set of tables (Tables 26-31) analyzes the insider trading activities 
stratified by ESOP structure (as in essay one). The second set (Tables 32-37) examines 
the relationship between the trading activities around the ESOP announcement and the 
sign of the prediction error. And the third set (Tables 38-43) provides the results of 
insider trades stratified by takeover attractiveness.
In sum, essay three analyzes the ESOP firms’ insider trading activities within the 
type/source/use and presence/absence of takeover frameworks previously described in 
essay one. In combination with the assumption that ESOPs allow managers to maintain 
voting control yet reduce their cash-flow ownership, the predicted results are as 
follows. ESOP announcements that typically produce a positive market reaction (e.g., 
ESOPs structured with repurchased equity) are associated with abnormal net purchasing 
activity prior to the ESOP announcement. Conversely, negative ESOP announcements 
(e.g., ESOP/convertible preferred issues) should be preceded by an abnormal level of 
insider sales. It is further hypothesized that the sell-off is not significant for firms that 
are attractive for takeover.
Essay three also examines the trading activity prior to an ESOP established in the 
presence of a takeover. Though ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity 
typically create a negative market reaction, it seems unlikely that a significant level of 
net insider sales are transacted around the announcement. The reduced sales are
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predicted because management will want to preserve its percentage of "entrenchment" 
votes. This prediction is also consistent with the "attractive" hypothesis of essay two, 
which suggests that insider sell-offs are significantly smaller for attractive firms.
Finally, essay three analyzes the relation between the ESOP announcement’s 
prediction error and the magnitude of the insider’s net selling activity prior to the 
announcement. An inverse relationship is supportive of the "preservation of insider 
wealth" hypothesis and suggests that the SEC trading penalties are somewhat 
ineffective. For example, it is hypothesized that a significant level of sell-offs are 
found prior to ESOP announcements that experience a significant negative market 
reaction. This relationship is also consistent with John and Mishra (1990), who contend 
that the insider trading and firm announcement are jointly used by the market to infer 
information in a more efficient manner.
5.4. Results
Two separate methods are employed to produce the following results. Tables 29- 
31, 35-37, and 41-43 are created by examining the firms’ individual insider trades as 
a whole. For example, the mean of all individual insider trades made in the (-6, 0) 
event-period, regardless offirm , is used in the difference-of-means testing procedures. 
In contrast, Tables 26-28, 32-34, and 38-40 are the result of first calculating the 
average value of each firm’s insider trading activity, then calculating the mean of all 
the firms’ averages. The purpose of the second method of analysis is to prevent the 
possibility that the results are dominated by a greater level of trading activity by 
managers o f a small number of firms. Based on this latter contention, the following
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Table 26
Net Number of Shares Purchased (Mean o f the firms’ averages).
ESO P STRUCTURE (-12,0) (-6,0) (0 ,+ 6 )
Non- -1207 -2071 -978 -2068 -750 -1977
Takeover .159 .091 .034
.044 .008 .002
Takeover -372 -959 -68 -1001 -1410 -896
.552 .543 .750
.452 .295 .894
Non-Tkvr -1375 -2497 -1152 -2497 -637 -2336
Repurch .159 .111 .005
.021 .005 .002
Non-Tkvr -751 1173 -513 -1181 -1003 -1247
Non-Repurch .583 .376 .854
.656 .490 .256
Non-Tkvr -819 -3456 -1126 -3456 89 -3456
CS .023 .063 .005
Repurch .038 .045 .005
Non-Tkvr -921 -381 -627 -423 -1873 -509
CS .495 .799 .497
Non-Repurch .781 .520 .263
Non-Tkvr -1438 -1301 -1384 -1301 -921 -1301
CPS .798 .885 .449
Repurch .628 .999 .151
Non-Tkvr -1290 -1371 -1469 -1371 -1740 -1371
CPS .967 .959 .854
Non-Repurch .798 .396 .798
Note: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean, t statistic 
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value. The second column is the estimation period’s mean.
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock.
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity.
Non-Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
In terp reta tion : (first column, first row) During the 12-month period prior to the ESOP
announcement, the mean number o f  shares sold by the manager (on a given trade) was 1,207. 
Compared to the average o f 2,071 shares sold by insiders during the estimation period, there is a 
. 159 (.044) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means 
t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
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Table 27
Net Dollar Value o f Shares Purchased (Mean of the firms’ averages).
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0, +  6)
Non-
Takeover
-41265
.118
.030
-65449 -43707
.281
.005
-65438 -29154
.019
.001
-64267
Takeover -5327
.069
.245
-48395 19209
.198
.209
-47715 -109448
.381
.812
-42383
Non-Tkvr
Repurch
-49806
.196
.032
-74893 -54775
.456
.007
-74893 -24474
.005
.002
-72620
Non-Tkvr
Non-Repurch
-20541
.229
.352
-43968 -15000
.122
.296
-44397 -39714
.847
.144
-45527
Non-Tkvr
CS
Repurch
-33719
.099
.046
-96525 -46738
.227
.067
-96525 -13577
.024
.006
-96525
Non-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch
-14579
.832
.538
-17519 -7891
.389
.393
-19228 -49495
.489
.201
-20221
Non-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch
-66226
.908
.556
-63875 -66956
.892
.341
-63875 -56514
.759
.119
-63875
Non-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch
-61853
.527
.798
-121026 -68053
.569
.999
-121026 -79348
.661
.798
-121026
Note: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean, t statistic 
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock. 
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity. 
Non-Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
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Table 28
Percentage o f Purchases (Mean o f the firms’ percentages).
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0 .+ 6 )
Non- .489 .492 .482 .489 .549 .487
Takeover .957 .883 .221
.878 .746 .189
Takeover .539 .472 .544 .481 .451 .485
.461 .517 .704
.426 .514 .699
Non-Tkvr .461 .430 .456 .430 .501 .432
Repurch .553 .652 .254
.736 .987 .462
Non-Tkvr .562 .622 .558 .613 .664 .605
Non-Repurch .463 .509 .473
.788 .729 .152
Non-Tkvr .431 .350 .385 .350 .596 .350
CS .419 .749 .029
Repurch .534 .784 .076
Non-Tkvr .613 .664 .617 .646 .750 .635
CS .621 .774 .273
Non-Repurch .855 .929 .054
Non-Tkvr .367 .367 .389 .367 .416 .367
CPS .996 .827 .619
Repurch .516 .664 .977
Non-Tkvr .322 .463 .354 .466 .360 .463
CPS .381 .499 .552
Non-Repurch .639 .684 .563
Note: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period's mean, t statistic 
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock. 
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity. 
Non-Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the absence o f  takeover activity.
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Table 29
Net Number o f Shares Purchased.
ESO P
STRU CTU RE
(-12,0) (-6,0) <0, +  6)
Non-
Takeover
-2145 -3223 
.016 
.057
-1517 -3217 
.001 
.018
-732 -2445 
.000 
.004
Takeover -1240 -996 
.552 
.002
-827 -1025
.752
.756
4828 -834 
.081 
.009
Non-Tkvr
Repurch
-2699 -3913 
.041 
.002
-1810 -3913 
.001 
.000
-856 -2861 
.000 
.031
Non-Tkvr
Non-Repurch
-850 -1243 
.328 
.001
-899 -1248
.524
.001
-356 -1296
.050
.056
Non-Tkvr
CS
Repurch
-1882 -5724
.058
.001
-1680 -5724 
.057 
.000
-934 -5724 
.002 
.001
Non-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch
-1805 -592
.239
.079
-1834 -629
.451
.439
-524 -737
.793
.040
Non-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch
-1273 -1506 
.387 
.000
-1346 -1506
.627
.003
-1402 -1506
.788
.428
Non-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch
-2583 -2970
.763
.963
-2886 -2970
.965
.989
-1442 -2970
.134
.158
Note: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period's mean, t statistic 
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock. 
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity. 
Non-Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
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Table 30
Net Dollar Value o f Shares Purchased.
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0. +  6)
Non-
Takeover
-74393 -108793
.009
.020
-66133 -108618
.004
.005
-45304 -99544 
.000 
.008
Takeover -53370 -72140 
.186 
.002
-30760 -71292
.049
.849
-79086 -60623
.842
.004
Non-Tkvr
Repurch
-96450 -133234 
.037 
.001
-87449 -133234
.023
.000
-50074 -121263 
.000 
.015
Non-Tkvr
Non-Repurch
-22903 -38481
.073
.003
-21644 -38855 
.091 
.001
-30568 -39582 
.476 
.121
Non-Tkvr
CS
Repurch
-83230 -197571 
.084 
.001
-84989 -197571 
.110 
.000
-26342 -197571 
.000 
.001
Non-Tkvr
CS
Non-Repurch
-38258 -23559
.269
.219
-32393 -25156
.676
.432
-37634 -26557
.562
.536
Non-Tkvr
CPS
Repurch
-72265 -73199 
.933 
.001
-71944 -73199
.923
.019
-95733 -73199
.309
.504
Non-Tkvr
CPS
Non-Repurch
-118129 -141410
.701
.759
-137455 -141410 
.967 
.861
-71225 -141410
.171
.118
Vote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean, t statistic 
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS =  ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock. 
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the presence o f takeover activity. 
Non-Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
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Table 31
Percentage o f Purchases.
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0 .+ 6 )
Non- .495 .496 .483 .496 .522 .509
Takeover .943 .551 .557
.943 .551 .556
Takeover .311 .454 .463 .461 .562 .468
.000 .964 .029
.000 .963 .030
Non-Tkvr .451 .419 .463 .419 .462 .437
Repurch .089 .061 .335
.085 .061 .345
Non-Tkvr .599 .717 .500 .454 .699 .705
Non-Repurch .001 .001 .869
.001 .001 .869
Non-Tkvr .363 .317 .396 .317 .539 .317
CS .248 .102 .000
Repurch .249 .102 .000
Non-Tkvr .521 .616 .523 .599 .677 .584
CS .064 .246 .160
Non-Repurch .064 .246 .161
Non-Tkvr .522 .424 .534 .424 .419 .424
CPS .001 .005 .914
Repurch .001 .005 .914
Non-Tkvr .314 .328 .333 .328 .429 .328
CPS .879 .962 .315
Non-Repurch .881 .965 .315
Vote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period's mean, t statistic 
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
CS = ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock. 
CPS =  ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock.
Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the presence of takeover activity. 
Non-Tkvr =  ESOPs announced in the absence o f takeover activity.
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Table 32
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Net Number of Shares Purchased (Mean of 
the firms’ averages).
E SO P
STR U CTU RE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0,4-6)
Positive PEs -723 -2941
.078
.087
-527 -2941 
.062 
.025
-698 -2941
.033
.049
Negative PEs -1133 -2019
.615
.640
-1433 -2019
.764
.726
-1443 -1786 
.888 
.661
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03.
Negative PE’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
In terp reta tion : (first column, first row) During the 12-month period prior to the ESOP
announcement, the average number o f shares sold by the manager (on a given trade) was 723. 
Compared to the average o f 2,941 shares sold by insiders during the estimation period, there is a 
.078 (.087) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means 
t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
Table 33
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Net Dollar Value of Shares Purchased (Mean 
of the firms’ averages).
ESO P
STRU CTU RE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0,4-6)
Positive PEs -46829 -66447 
.583 
.262
-41686 -66447
.505
.070
-20396 -66447
.117
.118
Negative PEs -26493 -42541
.501
.686
-32324 -45241
.607
.941
-33021 -35569
.948
.964
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03. 
Negative P E ’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
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firms’
statistic
Positive PE’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03. 
Negative PE’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
Table 35
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Net Number of Shares Purchased.
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0. +  6)
Positive PEs -2310 -4462 
.026 
.024
-2391 -4462
.086
.235
-1388 -4462 
.000 
.013
Negative PEs -1439 -620
.292
.031
-389 -620 
.808 
.936
-694 44 
.404 
.116
Note: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are t le event period’s mean, t
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive PE’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03. 
Negative PE’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
Table 34
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Percentage of Purchases (Mean of the 
percentages).
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0 ,+ 6)
Positive PEs .440 .388
.556
.798
.456 .388
.463
.812
.567 .388 
.075 
.166
Negative PEs .504 .541
.771
.959
.591 .541
.745
.475
.552 .545
.880
.999
Sote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean, t 
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
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Table 36
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Net Dollar Value of Shares Purchased.
ESO P
STRU CTU RE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0 ,+ 6 )
Positive PEs -104799 -179774
.014
.095
-112540 -179774
.052
.448
-40357
.000
.026
-179774
Negative PEs -32171 -21306
.409
.089
-16211 -21306
.727
.782
-24868
.102
.317
11663
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03. 
Negative PE’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
Table 37
Positive/Negative Prediction Errors: Percentage of Purchases.
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0, +  6)
Positive PEs .409 .350
.069
.069
.356 .350 
.882 
.882
.454 .350
.028
.028
Negative PEs .508 .613
.151
.151
.714 .613
.304
.303
.538 .619
.339
.339
Vote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are t le event period’s mean, t
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Positive P E ’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error in excess o f .03. 
Negative P E ’s =  all ESOP firms that experienced a prediction error below -.03.
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Table 38
Attractive/Unattractive: Net Number of Shares Purchased (Mean o f the firms’ 
averages).
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0, +  6)
Attractive -1350 -2338 
.218 
.105
-1384 -2328
.471
.087
-1221 -2328 
.181 
.239
Unattractive -2283 -2233
.975
.948
-1251 -2233
.464
.489
-1759 -1887 
.945 
.168
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
In terp reta tion : (first column, first row) During the 12-month period prior to the ESOP
announcement, the average number o f shares sold by the manager (on a given trade) was 1,350. 
Compared to the average o f 2,338 shares sold by insiders during the estimation period, there is a 
.218 (. 105) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means 
t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
Table 39
Attractive/Unattractive: Net Dollar Value of Shares Purchased (Mean of the firms’ 
averages).
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) <0,+6)
Attractive -41100
.096
.052
-80455 -46029
.467
.070
-80280 -50491
.157
.221
-80280
Unattractive -45941
.880
.996
-49482 -30518
.354
.483
-49482 -42419
.995
.272
-44755
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
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Table 40
Attractive/Unattractive: Percentage of Purchases (Mean of the firms’ percentages).
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0 ,+ 6 )
Attractive .497 .437
.290
.364
.502 .407
.299
.397
.477 .434
.483
.917
Unattractive .446 .509
.441
.384
.475 .509
.690
.707
.564 .518
.605
.431
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Table 41
Attractive/Unattractive: Net Number of Shares Purchased.
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0 ,+ 6 )
Attractive -3247 -3385
.851
.090
-2522 -3234
.363
.777
-676 -3234 
.001 
.010
Unattractive -1819 -3655
.029
.743
-1399 -3655
.005
.974
-780 -1582
.075
.003
Vote: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean,
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
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Table 42
Attractive/Unattractive: Net Dollar Value of Shares Purchased.
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0, +  6)
Attractive -117809 -141632 
.001 
.083
-103940 -141042
.179
.346
-61491 -141042 
.000 
.005
Unattractive -43173 -79127 
.000 
.606
-35569 -79127 
.000 
.921
-19159 -52214 
.002 
.013
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
Table 43
Attractive/Unattractive: Percentage of Purchases.
ESO P
STRUCTURE
(-12,0) (-6,0) (0 ,+ 6 )
Attractive .312 .371
.003
.003
.368 .371
.902
.902
.455 .371
.005
.005
Unattractive .489 .536
.059
.059
.462 .536
.017
.019
.636 .598
.346
.347
Note: The three rows in the first column (within each box) are the event period’s mean
p-value, and Wilcoxon rank-sum p-value.
The second column within each box is the estimation period’s mean.
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discussion of results will concentrate on Tables 26-28, 32-34, and 38-40. Furthermore, 
given the essay’s focus on insider ownership (e.g., the net number o f insider shares 
traded) and wealth maximization (e.g., the net dollar value of insider shares traded), 
the discussion will be further limited to Tables 26, 32, and 38 and Tables 27, 33, and 
39, respectively.
In relation to an ESOP’s structure and insider trades, the results o f Tables 26 and 
27 are consistent. Both tables show that non-takeover ESOPs, ESOPs structured with 
repurchased equity (in the absence of takeover activity), and common stock ESOPs 
structured with repurchased equity demonstrate a level of insider sales that is 
significantly lower than average in the twelve months before, and six months after, the 
announcement.45 Given the fact that significant insider purchases are conspicuous to 
the scrutiny of SEC review (for insider trading compliance), a significant reduction in 
shares sold is a more rational and expected result for the analysis of insider trades 
around these subsets of ESOP announcements that typically elicit positive market 
reactions (essay one).
More important, however, is the finding (comparable to essay one’s results) that 
ESOPs structured with repurchased equity have a significant effect on the overall 
results. That is, it appears that the significant "non-takeover" insider trading results are
45For example, note the "Non-Tkvr/Repurch" non-parametric P-values of .021, .005, and .002 (Table 
26) and .032, .007, and .002 (Table 26) for the (-12,0), (-6,0), and (0, + 6 ) periods, respectively. These 
Table 26 results for the (-12,0) period are interpreted as follows: During the 12-month period prior to 
the ESOP announcement, the mean number o f shares sold by the manager (on a given trade) was 1,375. 
Compared to the average o f 2,497 shares sold by the insiders during the estimation period, there is a . 149 
(.021) probability that the means (medians) differ by chance, based on the difference-of-means t-test 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test).
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caused by the sample o f ESOPs structured with repurchased equity. This is noted by 
comparing the significance of the reductions in insider sales for the non-takeover/non­
repurchase and non-takeover/repurchase categories. Moreover, the "repurchase" effect 
is restricted to the category of ESOPs structured with previously unissued common 
stock. ESOPs structured with convertible preferred stock exhibit insignificant 
reductions in managerial sell-offs for both repurchase and non-repurchase samples.
In addition to supporting the first essay’s results that ESOPs structured with 
repurchased equity have an overriding positive effect on the market, the results 
described above are consistent with the asymmetric information arguments (section 
3.1.1) and the personal wealth maximization contentions (section 5.1.1). That is, the 
insiders’ reduction in sell-offs prior to the ESOP/repurchased equity announcement is 
consistent with the asymmetric information argument that the managers believe the 
equity is underpriced. It is also consistent with the contention that management is 
maximizing personal wealth by reducing its level of equity sales prior to an 
announcement that typically enhances shareholder wealth.
In contrast, the insignificant "convertible preferred" findings (of Tables 26 and 27) 
do not support the hypothesis that an increase in insider sales is expected prior to the 
predicted significant negative effect on shareholder wealth. The insignificant results for 
the takeover sample do, however, support the contention that management will not 
significantly reduce their level of inside ownership even though a material drop in 
shareholder wealth is expected on the day of the ESOP announcement. This argument
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is based on the notion that management will want to preserve their level of votes for 
entrenchment purposes.
In relation to the maximization of personal wealth arguments, the results of Tables 
32 and 33 support the contention that the level o f insider sales will decrease prior to the 
release of significant positive news. The "positive news" is proxied by ESOP 
announcements that have prediction errors in excess of 3 percent, and the Table 32 
findings suggest that managers significantly decrease their level of shares sold around 
the announcement. Conversely, insider trading is insignificantly affected by ESOP 
announcements associated with predictions errors below -3 percent (the proxy for 
negative news). True support for the wealth maximization hypothesis would be a 
significant sell-off of shares prior to the negative announcement and price reaction.
Furthermore, support for the argument that managers are using their insider 
information to maximize shareholder wealth should actually be judged by the change 
in the dollar value of shares sold (Table 33), not the number of shares sold (Table 32). 
In this regard, the evidence is relatively weak. That is, the only support for the wealth 
maximization hypothesis is the (-6,0) period’s significant (p-value of 0.07) reduction 
in the dollar value of insider sales prior to ESOPs experiencing a prediction error in 
excess of 3 percent (Table 33).
Support for the unattractive/attractive hypotheses is also weak. Table 39 provides 
slight evidence that managers of firms that are attractive for takeover will reduce their 
level of sales to preserve their entrenchment votes. The (-12,0) and (-6,0) non- 
parametric p-values of .052 and .070 (respectively) weakly suggest that managers are
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reducing the dollar value of personal sales prior to ESOP announcements made by firms 
that are attractive for takeover. Because "entrenchment" pertains to the level of votes 
(i.e., number of shares owned), not the dollar value of personal equity, the results of 
Table 38 are a more accurate measure of the attractive/unattractive effects on 
shareholder wealth. In this case, the .105 and .087 p-values (for the (-12,0) and (-6,0) 
periods) further weaken the support for the argument that managers of attractive firms 
will reduce their level of insider sales around the ESOP announcement. (A superior 
test of this hypothesis would involve the analysis of insider trading activity in the 
months surrounding the date when management first realized that their firm was 
attractive for takeover, an extremely difficult time to determine.)
5.5. Conclusion
One purpose of this essay is to extend the "ESOP structure" findings of the first 
essay into an insider trading framework. This extension includes the asymmetric 
information hypothesis’ key assumption that managers are privy to information pertinent 
to the true value of the firm. The market attempts to infer this private information 
from the decisions announced by management, including the securities issuance 
structure of the ESOP. The final step is the revaluation o f the firm after the private 
information is inferred from the announcement.
By incorporating the assumption that insiders trade to maximize their personal 
wealth, this essay contends that the managers’ trading activities in the stock of their 
firm are affected by those ESOP structures that significantly affect firm value. In 
particular, to enhance personal wealth, it is hypothesized that managers will increase
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the level of shares purchased prior to an announcement that elicits a significant positive 
market response. As described in section 5.4. given the scrutiny of the SEC, a more 
likely reaction (than an increase in the level of shares purchased) is a reduction in the 
level of shares sold. Consistent with this contention is the finding that insiders 
significantly reduce the level of personal sales prior to the announcement o f ESOPs 
structured with repurchased equity, a structure shown to have a positive effect on 
market value (essay one).
Essay three also predicts a larger insider sell-off of shares prior to those ESOP 
announcements that typically decrease the value of the firm. This prediction is not 
supported by the results. There is an insignificant effect on insider trades in the period 
surrounding the announcement o f ESOPs structured with convertible preferred equity. 
Though a similar insignificant effect on insider trading is found for ESOPs announced 
in the presence of takeover activity, an increase in insider sales is not expected (despite 
the hypothesized significant and negative market reaction; essay one) because 
management prefers to retain their shares for entrenchment purposes. Though similar 
predictions are made for the insider trading activities of firms that are attractive for 
takeover, the findings weakly support the hypothesized attractive/unattractive effects on 
insider trading.
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Chapter 6 
Summary
6.1. Conclusion
The popularity of employee stock ownership plans in the mid-to-late 1980s is 
frequently attributed to an ESOP’s tax advantage and anti-takeover effectiveness, as 
discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.4. Though the frequency of ESOP creations has 
recently dropped with the downturn in takeover activity and the reduction in ESOP tax 
benefits, ESOPs remain a viable employee benefit plan available to management. 
Furthermore, given the continuously changing environments affecting the applicable tax 
laws and market for corporate control, ESOPs may, once again, become a popular 
employee benefit plan. Thus, a further examination o f ESOPs is warranted to 
understand the past, and assist in the future, ESOP-related managerial decisions.
Regardless of the benefit of an increased understanding of ESOPs, this examination 
adds to the finance literature in several ways. First, additional support is provided for 
the asymmetric information hypothesis as it relates to the securities issuance structure 
of the ESOP. Consistent with the asymmetric information argument is the significant 
positive (weakly significant and negative) effect on shareholder wealth associated with 
the announcement of an ESOP structured with repurchased equity (convertible preferred 
equity). In support of a revised asymmetric information hypothesis, which contends 
that the actions of management are guided by its concern for the welfare of the firm’s 
shareholders and employees, is the finding that ESOPs structured with convertible 
preferred equity (and no simultaneous repurchase announcement) have a larger negative
139
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effect on firm value than ESOPs structured with previously unissued common stock. 
This finding is exactly opposite to the arguments and results of previous securities 
issuance research.
The most notable finding o f the ESOP/securities issuance analysis, however, is the 
overriding positive effect attached to ESOPs structured with repurchased equity. The 
results suggest that the significant positive effects associated with most ESOP structures 
are solely caused by the presence of simultaneous repurchase announcement. For 
example, the findings of essay one show that ESOPs structured with common stock and 
a simultaneous repurchased equity announcement have a significant and positive effect 
on shareholder wealth. In contrast, common stock ESOPs structured without 
repurchased equity experience insignificant wealth effects. Comparable repurchase/non­
repurchase results are noted for "non-takeover" ESOPs structured with convertible 
preferred equity, leveraged ESOPs, and the overall sample of ESOPs.
Similarly, the presence of repurchased equity appears to have a significant effect 
on the insider trading activities o f the firm’s managers around the announcement of an 
ESOP (essay three). In general, no unusual changes in the managers’ trading patterns 
are noted except for the sample of firms announcing an ESOP structured with 
repurchased equity. To be specific, a significant reduction in the level of insider sales 
is found for firms with an announced ESOP structured with repurchased equity. 
Similar structures announced without a simultaneous repurchase announcement have no 
significant effect on the managers’ trading patterns. In sum, the overall results suggest
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
that the structure of the ESOP (in particular, ESOPs structured with repurchased equity) 
has a significant effect on firm value and insider trading activity.
In addition to the findings that suggest the importance of the ESOP structure chosen 
by management, this analysis contributes to the literature with its acknowledgement of 
a firm’s takeover "attractiveness" and supermajority provisions, and their effects on 
insider ownership and the market for corporate control. Previous insider ownership 
research implicitly assumes that all firms with an identical percentage o f managerial 
ownership have an equal probability of being taken over (i.e., they are equally 
"attractive"), regardless of differences in features such as firm-size, leverage, and 
growth. Furthermore, prior empirical analyses infer that firms with identical insider 
ownership have equal protection against takeover attempts despite the fact that the 
firms’ takeover veto powers may differ by the state of incorporation, and corporate 
bylaw, supermajority provisions.
By incorporating these effects into the ESOP/insider ownership analyses, essay two 
provides insight into an ESOP’s effect on managerial voting power and its relation with 
the change in firm value. In addition, it is shown that these effects differ for ESOP 
firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. In particular, the findings 
suggest that the market reacts negatively to ESOP announcements that increase the level 
o f managerial voting power to a level of entrenchment when the firm has characteristics 
that make it "attractive for takeover." Conversely, no significant market reaction is 
noted for unattractive firms that have a similar increase in managerial voting power.
Thus, the outcome of accounting for the firms’ supermajority provisions and 
takeover attractiveness is the finding that suggests that the market differentiates between
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firms that are attractive and unattractive for takeover. In relation to corporate control 
research, the intuitive appeal, and significant findings, of essay two suggest that the 
calculation of a firm’s managerial voting power should adjust for the differences in 
supermajority provisions. Essay two also supports the argument that the analyzed firms 
should be partitioned by their level of takeover attractiveness to prevent dilutive results.
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